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OBJECTIVES BEHIND THE ‘INTEGRATED APPROACH’ 
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Summary: The upsurge in pirate attacks on European vessels in the 
Gulf of Aden during 2008 brought the forgotten confl ict of Somalia 
back onto the international political agenda. It soon became clear that 
no initiative off the Somali coast could be effective unless it was ac-
companied by efforts to relieve the root causes of piracy. This arti-
cle examines fi rst the essential features of the situation in Somalia, 
providing the necessary background to fully grasp not only the root 
causes of piracy, but also the risk to Western security posed by recent 
developments in this failed State. As regards the European Union, pi-
racy-related incidents in the Gulf of Aden entail multi-faceted threats 
against European interests. A key question which arises is the extent 
to which the European response to Somali pirates truly follows a com-
prehensive, integrated approach. Following an empirical analysis of 
development co-operation tools implemented in Somalia over recent 
years, as well as a thorough assessment of the legal mandate and 
several shortcomings faced by the fi rst EU naval military operation, 
EU NAVFOR-Atalanta, we conclude that the EU response to piracy 
is stretched and inadequate both on land and off-shore. Therefore, 
the reality contradicts to a great extent political statements at the EU 
level. A possible explanation for this somewhat frustrating outcome is 
provided by a theoretical examination of the objectives (besides hav-
ing an impact on the ground in Somalia) behind EU Foreign Policy. 
Objectives linked to the visibility of the EU as a global actor, as well as 
the Europeanisation of foreign and internal policies of Member States 
will be particularly emphasised.
1. The root causes of piracy off the Somali coast - the call for an 
integrated approach both on land and off-shore 
Somalia was ranked fi rst in the Failed States Index in 2008.1 This 
dubious distinction gives the misleading impression that the borders of 
* Maria Luisa Sanchez Barrueco, Professor and Researcher, Institute for European Studies, 
University of Deusto, Spain.
1 ‘The Failed States Index 2008’ Foreign Policy (2008) July/August, <http://www.foreign-
policy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350&page=1>. All internet references were last ac-
cessed 12 June 2009.
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Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia, together with the Indian Ocean, demarcate 
a state in the Horn of Africa. However, this land has actually been home 
to several powers since enemy clans ousted Siad Barre’s dictatorial re-
gime in 1991, a year marking the beginning of the country’s descent into 
political turmoil and anarchy. 
The offi cial government of Somalia, usually known as the Transi-
tional Federal Government (TFG), was formed in late 2004 after a two-
year peace process supported by Kenya and the US. The international 
community recognised the TFG and actively backed it with fi nancial aid 
aimed at improving governance and relieving the conditions of the popu-
lation. Nevertheless, the TFG has proven unable to act as an effective 
central government, since vast areas of the country are not under its con-
trol. A large northern region (Somaliland) soon declared its independence 
in 1991 and has remained stable ever since, despite not being offi cially 
recognised by foreign governments. Puntland has also been a self-govern-
ing region since 1998. It does not aim at independence, but has its own 
king and local institutions. The southern part of the country is shared 
out between Islamic militias and local warlords.
In June 2006, a coalition of clerics, business leaders, and Islamic 
court militias known as the Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU) defeated power-
ful Mogadishu warlords gathered together as part of the Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism and took control of the capi-
tal. Mogadishu was won back with the help of Ethiopian troops, backed 
by the United States, six months later. However, Islamic militias have 
continued to struggle for power with the TFG, local clans and foreign 
troops.
Somalia provides yet another example of the blowback effect of for-
eign military intervention in failed States. On the insistence of the United 
Nations (UN), and ultimately of the US, concerned at the prospect of So-
malia becoming another piece in the ‘War on Terrorism’ puzzle, Ethio-
pia agreed in early 2006 to send troops to its neighbour and traditional 
enemy. The main goal was to win back the capital city Mogadishu and 
reinforce the TFG against the Islamist threat in the south. But a wave of 
support for Islamic militias spread through the country as the occupying 
forces moved forward. Ideology was apparently not the underlying driv-
ing force. According to analysts,2 the population simply wanted a return 
to normal civilian life, and Sharia law was a cheap price to pay for law 
and order, something that foreign troops could not offer. In the end, two 
years of solving its neighbour’s problems was a far too heavy burden for 
2  B Jopson, ‘Which enemy is greater: Islamists or hijackers?’ Financial Times (Washington 
25 November 2008) <http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto112420082049
034221&page=2>.
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Ethiopia to bear alone, and it thus welcomed the UN-sponsored Djibouti 
Peace Agreement calling for its withdrawal as of June 2008.3 The opera-
tion started in November and saw the abandonment of Ugandan and Bu-
rundian AMISOM soldiers4 to their fate. 
The Djibouti peace process may be seen as the starting point of a 
gradual, albeit signifi cant, shift in the international community perspec-
tive on Somalia. Support had traditionally been given to clan leaders. The 
Chair of the TFG, Abdullahi Yusuf, was in fact originally from the Punt-
land governing clan. However, the TFG had proven unable to succeed in 
stabilising the country over the years5 and its weakness helped the spread 
of radical Islamism. A new path seen as the best way to stabilise Somalia 
was to endorse moderate Islamists, and representatives of the Alliance for 
the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) were recognised as valid partners for 
negotiations in Djibouti. The TFG was further weakened for two reasons. 
First, without the support of Ethiopian forces, Islamic militias gradually 
regained control over swaths of Somalia. Second, in-fi ghting between the 
president and two successive prime ministers fi nally resulted in the res-
ignation of President Yusuf on 29 December 2008. A moderate Islamist, 
Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, was elected on 2 February 2009 as Somalia’s new 
president. His election caused initial scepticism because he had chaired 
the Islamic Courts’ Union government in 2006 and had also taken part 
in the Djibouti peace process as the leader of the moderate faction of the 
3  The Djibouti Peace Agreement was signed on 9 June 2008 between the TFG and the Alli-
ance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in the presence of a number of observer States 
(France, UK, US, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti) and groups (African Union, European Union, 
League of Arab States, and the Organization of Islamic Conferences). The agreement pro-
vided several important points: fi rst, a ceasefi re between TFG and ARS forces for an initial 
period of 90 days, which would be renewable; second, a request to the UN for the deploy-
ment of an international stabilisation force from countries friendly to Somalia but exclud-
ing neighbouring States (thus not naming traditional enemies such as Ethiopia or Eritrea); 
third, the formal dissociation of the ARS from any armed groups or individuals not adhering 
to the peace process; fourth, an engagement to ensure unhindered humanitarian access to 
affected populations; and fi fth, the establishment of a Joint Security Committee to follow 
up the implementation of security agreements. The full text of the agreement is available 
at <http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2008/Jun/agreement_between_transitional_federal_
governament_and_the_allaince_for_re_liberation_of_somalia.aspx>.
4  AMISOM (numbering less than 3,0000 Ugandan and Burundian troops) is a regional 
peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Na-
tions [UNSC Res 1772 (20 August 2007)]. It started in January 2008 and had been renewed 
six-monthly until June 2009. Its mandate covers support to the TFG, implementation of a 
national security plan, training Somali security forces, and assistance in creating a secure 
environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Since the Ethiopian troops’ withdrawal 
made AMISOM the main target of attacks, panic-driven indiscriminate reactions have in-
creasingly attracted grievous accusations of human rights violations <http://www.hrw.
org/en/news/2009/02/05/somalia-new-violence-highlights-need-independent-inquiry>.
5  See European Parliament, Resolution on the situation in the Horn of Africa, 15 January 
2009, doc. P6_TA(2009)0026 point H. 
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ARS opposing the TFG. On the one hand, there were certain fears about 
supporting a politician with such a close association with the Al-Qaeda 
faction in Somalia,6 whilst on the other, the perception was that he was 
the last chance to form a national unity government in Somalia.7 
Despite Western support, President Sharif’s internal position as of 
June 2009 is paradoxically weaker than that of the erstwhile UIC govern-
ment. His resolution introducing Sharia law, though not interpreting it 
strictly, was passed by the Somali Parliament in April, which gave him 
some room to manoeuvre and be accepted by both local Islamists and 
the international community. Additionally, he also succeeded in convinc-
ing the UN-sponsored International Conference in support of the Somali 
Security Institutions (Brussels, 22-23 April 2009) to commit USD 213 
million to improving Somalia’s security sector.8 Nevertheless, the hard-
line wing of the ARS, known as Al-Shabaab (‘Youth’), which did not ac-
cept the terms of the Djibouti peace agreement, have gradually taken 
over the southern part of the country, with the alleged connivance of Al-
Qaeda leaders in the city of Kismayo as well as Eritrean volunteers. These 
radical Islamists have declared war on both the TFG of President Sharif 
and Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca, an umbrella group of traditionally peaceful 
Sunni sects who do not share the strict Saudi Arabian-inspired Wahhabi 
interpretation of Islam.9 
6  Suffi ce it to mention that two of his closest allies in 2004 were Aden Hashi Farah ‘Eyrow’, 
the alleged leader of Al-Qaeda in Somalia, who was assassinated in an US selective attack 
on 1 May 2008, and Hassan Dahir Aweys, a hard-line leader of the Al-Shabaab militia, who 
has been on the US list of terrorists since November 2001, even if they split paths after the 
Djibouti peace process.
7  ‘… we must acknowledge that although President Sharif used to be a part of the Islamic 
Courts, he is now leading a broad-based transitional unity government, he is trying to im-
plement the Djibouti Peace Agreement. He is trying to prevent the exploitation of youth and 
the abuse of Islam.’ David Miliband (British Foreign Secretary), ‘Our shared future: building 
coalitions and winning consent’, Speech at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, 21 May 
2009 <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=18130489>.
‘…for over a year, we had been seeking to persuade our Western partners that Sheikh Sharif 
was the only leader capable of rallying a consensus to support him.’ Bernard Kouchner 
(French Foreign Minister), ‘Piraterie: pourquoi la France aide la Somalie’, Le Figaro (Paris, 
22 April 2009), English translation at <http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article3818>.
‘The TFG of Somalia has courageously committed itself to leading a broad-based political 
process … through peaceful means. … I reiterate all my solidarity and fi rm support to the 
government of Somalia’. Javier Solana (EU High Representative for the CFSP), ‘Statement 
reiterating solidarity and support for the transitional government of Somalia’ (12 May 2009) 
S/123/09 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/dec-
larations/107655.pdf>.
8  See Final Communiqué at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/misc/107357.pdf>.
9  Al-Shabaab’s techniques actually seek to terrorise the population in areas under its con-
trol (ML Sanchez Barrueco, Interview with Somali novelist Mohamed Khalif Jama, 26 April 
2009). This includes the stoning to death of a 13 year-old rape victim (‘Stoning victim begged 
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In short, Somalia has moved fast towards a civil war on religious 
grounds, a fact that makes the assessments provided just a year ago no 
longer valid. At the beginning of 2008, the EC Delegation in Nairobi de-
scribed the confl ict as distinct, stating that Somalia, unlike other States 
suffering internal wars in the 21st century, was not torn by language, 
religion, ethnicity or culture, but mostly by clan affi liation. 
The Somali people have not historically espoused a governance sys-
tem predicated on a nation-state. Rather, the pre-eminent focus of 
the social, legal, political and economic organization of the Somali 
nation has been and remains the clan. … The four major Somali 
clan families, each comprising well over a million members, are the 
Darod, the Hawiye, the Dir and the Digil-Mirifl e. It is the power and 
resource-sharing relationships between these xolos and among their 
sub-clans that primarily determine the viability of governance sys-
tems in Somalia.10
Although clans remain the primary feature of social organisation in 
Somalia, their political power has strongly diminished since Islamists be-
gan to regain infl uence at the end of 2008. The reform of the national Par-
liament provides a good example of this shift. Traditionally, the 275 seats 
were equally divided among the four major clans, and a smaller amount 
of representation was awarded to a coalition of minor clans. In December 
2008, however, the size of the Parliament was doubled to include 200 
representatives of the ARS and 75 representatives of civil society and the 
diaspora. The religious division between radical and moderate Muslims is 
therefore rather recent and it would not be an exaggeration to say that it 
sprang up in reaction to foreign military occupation and is being encour-
aged by the foreign press, probably to justify further intervention.
While the political mayhem remains, Somalia keeps sinking into an 
almost irreparable humanitarian crisis.11 The civil war has killed thou-
for mercy’, BBC News, 4 November 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7708169.
stm>), teenage suicide bombers (‘Rebels claim Somali suicide bomb’, BBC News, 25 May 
2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8066807.stm>), desecration of Sunni graves 
(‘Somali rage at grave desecration’, BBC News, 8 June 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/8077725.stm>) and targeted assassination of Somali journalists (‘Fifth Somali 
journalist killed this year’, Garowe Online (Somalia 8 June 2009) <http://www.garoweon-
line.com/artman2/publish/Press_Releases_32/Fifth_Somali_journalist_killed_this_year.
shtml>).
10  EC Delegation in Nairobi, ‘The role of the Somali clan system’ Annex no 10 to European 
Commission Joint Strategy Paper for Somalia 2008-2013 <http://ec.europa.eu/develop-
ment/icenter/repository/scanned_so_csp10_en.pdf> 99.
11  According to information managed by the EC delegation in Nairobi, Somalia’s health 
indicators are some of the worst in Africa. Estimated life expectancy at birth is low, while 
average life expectancy is 47. Infant mortality is 115 deaths per 1,000 births. Infectious dis-
eases, nutritional defi ciencies and birth-related problems are major health risks, and water 
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sands of civilians, the number of internally displaced persons is around 
1.2 million people, and the remaining population teeters on the edge of 
famine in what has been repeatedly termed a ‘forgotten confl ict’.12 Ironi-
cally, it is not the massive humanitarian disaster on land but the situ-
ation off-shore which has succeeded in putting Somalia back onto the 
international agenda. 
The Somali coastline is 3,900 kilometres long and has one of the 
highest concentrations of fi sh in the world’s oceans. Somali fi sheries were 
once relatively profi table but suffered a sharp decline at the turn of the 
millennium for three main reasons. Firstly, the civil war destroyed the 
inland transport and refrigeration facilities essential for fi sh processing, 
with the result that this incipient industry simply ceased to exist. Sec-
ondly, no Somali government has been able to deter illegal fi shing in its 
territorial waters, and foreign ships have plundered halieutic resources, 
often using practices that show little consideration for fi sh stocks or local 
fi shermen.13 Last but not least, many unscrupulous European vessels 
saw the fragility of the TFG as an opportunity to dump toxic, even nu-
clear, waste in Somali waters.14 The subsequent impoverishment of the 
population in coastal cities has been repeatedly invoked to legitimise the 
rise of piracy, but the assumption that pirates are former Somali fi sher-
men has not been proven, at least not to a signifi cant extent. There seems 
to be a closer relationship with northern Somali clans connected with 
second-level offi cials within the Puntland administration.
Nevertheless, the upsurge in pirate-related attacks in the Indian 
Ocean in recent years, particularly since 2008,15 has turned the Somali 
borne diseases are on the increase. HIV/AIDS prevalence is estimated at less than 1% (2001). 
Primary school enrolment is only 20.8% for boys and 16.9% for girls. The overall adult literacy 
rate is 25% for males and 12% for females. Literacy in rural areas is extremely low.
12  NGOs still present in Somalia helplessly try to put the Somali humanitarian disaster 
back onto the international agenda. See Human Rights Watch (<http://www.hrw.org/af-
rica/somalia>) and Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘Reaching out. MSF in Somalia’ (13 August 
2007) <http://www.msf.org/source/countries/africa/somalia/2007/reaching_out_report.
pdf>.
13  Local fi shermen complained in 2006 that foreign fi shing boats did not have a licence and 
used illegal fi shing methods. Some of them would even allegedly hire Somali militias to drive 
away the local fi shermen. H Knaup, ‘The poor fi shermen of Somalia’ Der Spiegel (12 April 
2008) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,594457,00.html>.
14  The Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 unearthed dozens of containers of toxic 
waste and deposited them along the Somali coast. In 2006, a team of specialists sent to 
the region to investigate discovered nine toxic waste sites along 700 kilometres of coastline 
in southern Somalia, Knaup (n 13). The UN envoy to Somalia said in June 2008 that ‘So-
malia has become a dumping ground for solid waste, chemical waste and probably nuclear 
waste’, A Ould-Abdallah, ‘The crisis in Somalia’ (transcript) Chatham House (London 19 
June 2008) <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/fi les/11931_190608ouldabdallah.pdf>. 
15  According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMO), the number of incidents of piracy 
or armed robbery at sea against ships experienced an unprecedented 11% worldwide in-
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coast into some of the most dangerous waters in the world, forcing the 
international community, especially the world’s trading powers, to focus 
again on Somalia. The Gulf of Aden is a natural waterway linking the In-
dian Ocean with the Mediterranean. Rampant piracy in the region thus 
hampers industrial and consumer goods from reaching the European 
market via the traditional sea route. 
Confronting the piracy scourge off Somalia’s coast needs an integrat-
ed approach that encompasses short-term security or defence policy tools 
with long-term tools aimed at addressing lawlessness and impoverishment 
in Somalia itself. Such statements have often been heard among scholars 
as well as in the media. Nonetheless, the expression ‘integrated approach’ 
takes on a new meaning when used in connection with the European Un-
ion due to the fact that piracy off the Somali coast has become a multilevel 
and cross-pillar concern, as the following discussion will show.
Let us begin with integrated policies. The waters around the Horn 
of Africa are crucial to European economies. More than 16,000 vessels 
pass through the Gulf of Aden each year and the risk raised by piracy 
is so severe that some important shipping companies have already de-
cided to take the longer and more expensive sea route around the Cape 
of Good Hope off southern Africa.16 The negative impact on international 
trade is worsened by the soaring marine insurance premiums faced by 
ship-owners, which have grown tenfold in some cases. Energy supplies 
are another victim of pirate attacks, since 12% of the world’s traded oil 
passes through these waters.
The situation is also a harsh one for European fi shermen, an eco-
nomic sector already affected by rises in oil prices and diminishing ha-
lieutic resources. The tuna season off the Somali coast represents around 
35% of the yearly turnover for fi shermen. According to estimates, de-
creases in catches in 2008 caused a loss of over EUR 65m to the 43 EC 
crease, but a 200% one in comparison to 2007 in the critical trade corridor linking the Suez 
Canal and the Indian Ocean. IMO, Annual Piracy Report 2008 (2009) Doc. MSC.4/Circ.133 
(19 March 2009) <www.imo.org>. In March 2009, 6 vessels were hijacked and there were 
another 29 failed attempts. This trend increased in April, with 17 hijackings and 26 failed 
attempts.
16  Most shipping companies are reluctant to publicise having been the subject of a pi-
rate attack for fear of a bad impact on their image. This applies especially to robberies 
because any booty barely reaches the daily cost of chartering the vessel, J Henley, ‘All at 
sea’ Guardian (19 November 2008). Nevertheless, the high cost of the Suez Canal and the 
upsurge in piracy leading to soaring insurance costs have already pushed several of the 
most important maritime operators to divert their ships towards the Cape of Good Hope, 
particularly east-bound, when ships travel empty (R Wright, ‘Lines put new faith in Hope’ 
Financial Times (26 May 2009). The AP Møller-Maersk group (Europe’s biggest ship-owner, 
with 83 tankers), Svitzer (towage and salvage operator, a member of the latter) and Odfjell 
(the Norwegian owner of 90 chemical tankers) have decided on this already, Financial Times 
(22 November 2008). 
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fi shing boats operating in the zone in 2008.17 Shipping companies and 
fi shermen are fully covered by insurance, and therefore insurance com-
panies have urged European governments to fi nd an effective solution.
The fi nal link in the chain of those affected by piracy are European 
consumers, since the additional costs of diverting routes, complementary 
coverage, and even ransoms are generally passed on and fi nd their way 
into the prices that we pay for our goods. 
Pirate attacks entail a serious environmental risk as well. Such a 
threat often remains unsaid, but is increasingly likely, given the fact that 
targeted vessels are mostly oil or chemical tankers, and that pirates are 
using ever more powerful weaponry. A major environmental disaster in 
the Gulf of Aden could be triggered if a tanker were set on fi re or even 
sunk, a probability which grows day by day.
Finally, there is an effect on Development Policy, since the insecurity 
of the country both on land and off-shore makes it extremely diffi cult to 
deliver humanitarian aid. The MSF Co-ordinator in Somalia put it clearly 
as follows:
… all humanitarian aid activity implies an unsaid contract in which 
we support a suffering population and, in exchange, this population 
protects us and respects us. Now this contract has smashed into 
smithereens …[because of] a small but violent minority, … [and i]t 
will never be the same …18 
However, all experts seem to agree that initiatives off-shore will only 
be a band-aid until the root cause - widespread lawlessness in Somalia 
- is addressed on-shore. The platitude ‘fi nd stability on land fi rst, then 
order will return to the seas’ can only be achieved by means of develop-
ment aid.
As can be seen, piracy off the Somali coast has had a direct impact 
on different EU policies of what will be the fi rst pillar until the Lisbon 
Treaty comes into force (notably, commercial, fi sheries and development 
policies), calling for a reaction from their external wings. It also affects 
indirectly other integrated domains, such as the internal market, devel-
opment and environmental policy.
The third pillar - Justice and Home Affairs - is also concerned by 
piracy. Pirates deliberately target European individuals and companies 
abroad, casting doubt on the ability of European diplomacy to protect 
17  Carmen Llorente, ‘Seguros a precio de oro contra los piratas de Somalia’ El Mundo (Ma-
drid 1 December 2008).
18  Statement by Javier Fernández (MSF Co-ordinator in Somalia), El Mundo (Madrid 7 
February 2008) <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/02/07/cronicasdesdeafri-
ca/1202377064.html>.
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the integrity of their citizens in third countries. On land, aid workers19 
and journalists20 are either kidnapped by ransom-seeking thugs or killed. 
Off-shore, 2008 was a fateful year regarding the hijacking of vessels, and 
many Europeans were taken hostage. This strategy proved very lucrative 
for pirates, since the only solution to major kidnappings and vessel sei-
zures before the launching of the EU naval operation in December 2008 
was the payment of multi-million dollar ransoms by European govern-
ments and ship-owners.21 
But the main European initiative to tackle piracy in the Indian Ocean 
has been taken within the framework of the second pillar, the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), or more precisely the European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (ESDP), as the issue is perceived to be a security 
problem and therefore has escaped the ordinary realm of politics. Let 
us examine the array of threats to European security posed by Somali 
pirates.
European States are supposed to guarantee, even by force, the se-
curity of supply of goods and oil en route to European countries. How-
ever, pirate attacks have undermined western governments’ authority 
time and again, despite military efforts to stop them. Piracy in the Indian 
Ocean provides a good example of the post-Cold War concept of ‘asym-
metric warfare’: a conventional military fi ghting mostly non-State actors, 
with the military capability of the two sides being very unequal, and yet 
the more powerful belligerent remains profoundly vulnerable and unable 
to annihilate its smaller enemy, which is either dispersed on land (or sea) 
or it is easily mistaken for the civilians that widely support it, or it has 
nothing to lose in suicide or pirate attacks. 
Pirates have become increasingly audacious since the beginning of 
2008. Although they do not sail under the Jolly Roger any longer, ships 
transporting weapons, luxury yachts or even foreign warships have not 
daunted them. Moreover, pirates generally receive real or tacit support 
19  In December 2007, two MSF staff, both of whom were Spanish, were kidnapped in Bos-
saso in a week. In January 2008, three MSF staff, one of them French, were murdered in 
Kismayo (south Somalia). In July 2008, the UNDP representative in Somalia, Osman Ali 
Ahmed, was shot dead in Mogadishu. In January 2009, three MSF aid workers were ab-
ducted over a ten-day period in the central region.
20  Two journalists from The Daily Telegraph (Briton Colin Freeman and Spaniard José 
Cendón) were released on 4 January 2009, after 40 days of captivity and the reported pay-
ment of a ransom. Somali journalists are not so lucky, they simply get killed most times. 
According to Amnesty International, at least 10 Somali journalists have been killed in the 
last two years.   
21  A few years ago, ransoms were hundreds of thousands of dollars. In 2008, however, the 
highest ransom ever, reportedly USD 3.2 m, was paid for the Saudi supertanker Syrius Star 
months after its hijacking on 15 November 2008. Over USD 30m was paid in ransoms in 
2008.
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from the rest of the community, not just because they often present them-
selves as champions of Somali interests against the foreign invader.22 In 
fact, ransoms paid to pirates have, to a large extent, ended up in coastal 
cities, fl ourishing Eyl or Bosaso among them, leading to a positive net 
result on land: everyone benefi ts from the incoming cash, even regional 
leaders, apparently.23   
In addition, the military expansion of the Islamic Courts throughout 
the southern part of Somalia has raised security concerns among the 
western allies because of the alleged links between some of their factions 
and the Al-Qaeda East Africa network. A link between Somali pirates and 
Islamism has been suggested, but as mentioned before, piracy appears 
to have a closer relationship with certain Somaliland or Puntland clans 
than with Al-Qaeda, as the Al-Shabaab radical Islamic militia’s reaction 
to the seizure of the Arabian supertanker, Sirius Star, seems to prove.
As we have seen so far, piracy is defi nitely a cross-pillar subject af-
fecting integrated fi sheries and internal market EC policies as well as 
the home affairs and security pillars. Now the time has come to assess 
whether the various European initiatives addressing piracy off the Somali 
coast truly follow an integrated approach or whether they show signs of 
inconsistencies between the three remaining EU pillars.
2. Inconsistencies and limitations of the European response to piracy 
off the Somali coast
The ability to successfully put forward a comprehensive approach 
represents the difference between conventional power and structur-
al power in foreign policy. The post-Cold War context undermined the 
structures which supported the East-West order, and therefore States 
felt the need to strengthen their military capabilities to survive in an 
increasingly dangerous world. At the same time, the breakdown of the 
old structures demanded a reorganisation of foreign policy according to 
non-conventional (structural) standards so that vulnerability could be 
diminished and foreign policy actors (States or international organisa-
tions) could infl uence long-term developments. In order to understand 
the following analysis, it is useful to recall the defi nition of ‘structural 
foreign policy’ and ‘conventional foreign policy’ according to Keukeleire 
and MacNaughtan:
22  Javier Espinosa, interview with Farah Ismail (pirate) El Mundo (Madrid 23 January 2009) 
<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/12/15/internacional/1229315057.html>; Xan 
Rice, interview with Asad Abdulahi (pirate) Guardian (22 November 2008) <http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/22/piracy-somalia>.
23  ‘Piracy brings rich booty to Somali shores’ Financial Times (3 March 2009) <http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/680c8924-0792-11de-9294-000077b07658.html>.
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Conventional foreign policy is orientated towards states, military se-
curity, crises and confl icts … Structural foreign policy refers to a 
foreign policy which, conducted over the long-term, seeks to infl u-
ence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security 
and mental structures.24 
The expression ‘comprehensive approach’ regarding peace-building 
made its way into Community jargon following the Balkan experience. This 
concept aims to address all aspects of structural instability in countries at 
risk in order to promote an environment leading to peace. A comprehensive 
approach assumes that confl icts cannot be overcome by diplomatic or mili-
tary means alone. However, this perspective requires an enormous amount 
of fi nancial resources and it is very time-consuming, because all EU actors 
involved must prioritise the objective of confl ict prevention in their policy 
towards the target country and thus accept concessions in terms of other 
policy objectives (eg commercial policy). This scale of involvement can only 
be afforded for a limited number of countries in the closest strategic circle 
of the EU (currently only the Balkans).25 As far as other regions are con-
cerned, insuffi cient EU implementation leads to scattered resources and 
therefore undermine EU credibility in the region. This might apply, as will 
be discussed next, to EC involvement in Somalia.
2.1. Elements of a European structural foreign policy in Somalia
a) Scarce and scattered long-term development tools
Development policy tools are primarily aimed at fostering sustain-
able conditions in the recipient country as declared in Article 177.1 of the 
EC Treaty. By virtue of its position as the biggest provider of development 
aid in the world, the EU (EC and Member States (MS)) is theoretically able 
to use development co-operation to trigger changes in third countries in 
line with specifi c foreign policy objectives (good governance and democ-
racy, respect for human rights, and confl ict prevention, among others). 
But some analysts have suggested that the EU relies too much on the 
positive spill-over of programmes fostering co-operation, democracy or 
economic assistance, without suffi ciently considering the actual impact 
of each initiative. In fact, democracy programmes can unleash extreme 
nationalism when newborn parties are based upon ethnic or religious 
divisions, whereas development and trade concessions can exacerbate 
inequalities among different identity groups.26 
24  S Keukeleire and J MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke 2008) 25-6.
25  Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (n 24) 218-9.
26  KE Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (2nd edn Polity Press, Cam-
bridge 2008) 165.
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In addition, the European Commission, which is in charge of manag-
ing development co-operation, highlighted in 2007 the need to count on 
rapid and fl exible instruments when dealing with fragile situations and 
recommended ‘a mapping of bilateral and EU aid modalities under the 
different pillars’ with a particular emphasis on the ‘complementarity be-
tween crisis management related instruments such as CFSP/ESDP joint 
actions, the Instrument for Stability, the African Peace Facility and long 
term cooperation instruments’.27
When it comes to Somalia, the European Commission manages de-
velopment co-operation through DG Development, inserting Somalia into 
the ACP group even if this country is not a signatory to the ACP-EC 
Partnership Agreement. The Commission manages most of the expendi-
ture of the EDF, despite it being fi nanced through national contributions, 
therefore escaping the general framework of the general budget of the 
European Union. Within the Commission, most EDF programmes are 
managed by the EuropeAid Co-operation Offi ce, but a small proportion 
related to humanitarian aid is managed by DG-ECHO (0.8% of total 2007 
payments). The Commission has repeatedly pointed out the high risks 
associated with management of the EDF28 but they do not apply to Soma-
lia, given the special features of this country, as will be shown next. As 
far as management is concerned, EDF resources are usually mobilised 
in two stages: fi rst, the Commission takes the fi nancing decision upon 
the request of the ACP State; second, a National Authorising Offi cer con-
cludes contracts and authorises payments which are in turn executed 
and audited by the Commission. The structural weaknesses inherent in 
governance regarding partner countries might entail waste of EU money. 
In the case of Somalia, however, the long-lasting power vacuum has led 
to the exclusion of all Somali authorities from the tasks assigned to the 
National Authorising Offi cer within the framework of the EDF. Instead, 
the Head of the EC delegation in Nairobi carries them out, supposedly 
acting on behalf of the Somali people.
The strategic framework for the co-operation of the European Com-
mission with Somalia under the 10th EDF is refl ected in the Joint Strategy 
Paper for Somalia 2008-2013.29 The Commission takes as its starting 
point the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and has produced an 
ambitious planning work that goes from cluster reports on different ar-
27  European Commission, Communication ‘Towards an EU response to situations of fragil-
ity - engaging in diffi cult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace’ 
COM (2007) 643, 25 October 2007, 12.
28  European Court of Auditors, 2007 Annual Report on the activities funded by the 7th, 8th 
and 9th EDFs [2008], OJ C286/02/273. 
29  Joint Strategy Paper (n 10). 
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eas,30 to identifying three pillars31 for future action, and strategic objec-
tives and focal sectors. However, the likelihood of these words having an 
actual impact on the ground is diffi cult to assess.  
In fact, a total amount of EUR 215.8m has been allocated through 
the EDF to Somalia during the 2008-2013 period, the biggest share of 
which (EUR 212m) is ‘to cover macroeconomic support, sectoral poli-
cies, programmes and projects’ by means of the Somalia Special Support 
Programme. The remainder (EUR 3.8m) is intended to cover unforeseen 
needs, such as emergency response. 
The EDF, which is primarily aimed at pursuing development objec-
tives, has interestingly evolved to cover security concerns as well, since it 
is fi nancing four African Union peace-keeping operations (AMISOM among 
them) through the African Peace Facility fi nancial instrument. As of 2007, 
in addition to a EUR 250m general fi nancial envelope, EUR 15m has been 
provided to the peace support operation to cover the operational costs of 
the AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu and the provision of troops. 
Food aid represents the bulk of EC aid to Somalia. Apart from the 
amounts already mentioned, Somalia has benefi ted from the Food Secu-
rity Thematic Programme with an initial allocation of EUR 12m for the 
period 2007-2010. This facility is managed by EuropeAid and therefore 
subject to call-for-tender procedures. In addition, Somalia has received 
EUR 27m as part of the food aid budgetary line in 2008, which is man-
aged by ECHO.32 Unlike EuropeAid, this offi ce is merely a donor and does 
not implement projects, but just fi nances them. Funds are channelled to 
the population through civil partners that have subscribed to a partner-
ship agreement with the Commission (NGOs, UN agencies and interna-
tional organisations) and then make specifi c requests in the event of an 
emergency situation. 
The high level of insecurity and risk in Somalia makes it extremely 
diffi cult to live up to expectations regarding development co-operation in 
30  First, governance, security and the rule of law; second, a macroeconomic policy frame-
work and data development; third, infrastructure; fourth, social services and protection of 
vulnerable groups; fi fth, productive sectors and the environment; and sixth, livelihoods and 
solutions for the displaced.
31  Roughly speaking, the fi rst is related to peace, security and good governance, covering 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, the establishment and strengthening of 
core public and private sector institutions, decentralisation, and confl ict resolution mecha-
nisms. The second pillar focuses on investing in people and covers social services and 
protection of vulnerable groups. The third pillar aims to establish a sustainable enabling 
environment for rapid poverty-reducing development, to expand employment and reduce 
poverty. Joint Strategy Paper (n 10) 25-33. 
32  European Commission, press release ‘European Commission provides €15 million for 
emergency food aid in the Horn of Africa’, IP/08/1527, 16 October 2008.
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most fi elds. To take as an example the goal of building an embryo of civil 
society, the Commission assumes that Somali non-State actors are not in 
a position to fulfi l the eligibility criteria to act directly as applicants or as 
partner organisations. Therefore, support to non-State actors in Somalia 
is paradoxically implemented by funding other countries’ non-State ac-
tors,33 even though all actions should be carried out in close co-operation 
with a Somali counterpart. The same applies to actions against antiper-
sonnel landmines, fi nanced under the long-term component of the In-
strument for Stability, where no initiative has been taken since 2005.34
Another development co-operation tool that does not seem to adapt 
well to Somalia’s situation is the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR). Its main asset is its fl exibility, which permits 
it to bypass partner governments and directly interact with non-State 
actors. However, the limited scope of projects makes the EU look more 
interested in enhancing its visibility on the ground than in fostering true 
change in the target country. The investment of the EIDHR in Somalia 
fi ts this impression of scarce and scattered aid which is always granted 
to European actors35 that do not seem to have close links with the Somali 
diaspora.
To sum up, EC development tools in Somalia depend primarily on 
short-term tools such as food aid that are intended to alleviate the situ-
ation of extreme hunger and drought but do not provide the conditions 
required for long-term development. Long-term development tools appear 
to be scarce and scattered. In addition, the building of civil society is of-
fi cially marginalised by default in EC development co-operation in Soma-
lia. Projects implemented by the European Commission do not thus ben-
efi t from the traditional advantages of community participation,36 namely 
33  European Commission, Guidelines for grant applicants, Open call for proposals 2008, 
EUROPEAID/128091/L/ACT/SO. 
34  European Commission, Action against antipersonnel landmines in Somalia, closed 18 
July 2005, EuropeAid/121327/C/G/SO.
35  Over the 2000-2006 period, there were only six projects fi nanced by the EIDHR in Soma-
lia: setting aside a EUR 1m grant to an Italian NGO working for the eradication of Female 
Genital Mutilation (2006-2009) and a EUR 1.158m grant to a Swedish Christian NGO to 
foster democracy and reconciliation over a 2-year period; other allocations were smaller and 
aimed at promoting the protection of children against violence (a EUR 846,000 grant to a 
Finnish NGO covering Somalia and three other countries over a 3-year period), support-
ing human rights and peace organisations (a EUR 331,000 grant to a Dutch NGO over 19 
months), empowering civil society through demobilisation and reintegration (a EUR 11,594 
grant to a UK consultant), and enhancing gender considerations (a EUR 550,000 grant to 
a Swiss NGO over one year). EuropeAid, EIDHR 2000-2006, <http://ec.europa.eu/europe-
aid/where/worldwide/eidhr/documents/updated_report_by_location_en.pdf>.
36  World Bank, The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, <http://www.worldbank.org/
wbi/sourcebook/sbpdf.htm>; FAO, ‘Participation: our vision’ <http://www.fao.org/partici-
pation/ourvision.html>.
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better consideration of the specifi c local features, a better cost-benefi t 
relation, and sustainability of their positive impact in the long run.
b) A new legal framework to combat illegal fi shing
There are other European initiatives that might have an impact on 
the root causes of piracy in the long run. The new regime against illegal 
fi shing, adopted in September 2008 within the framework of the Fisher-
ies Policy, is noteworthy in this respect. 
Illegal fi shing or, to be more precise, illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated (IUU) fi shing covers fi shing without licences and all fi shing activi-
ties that infringe on national, regional or international regulations and 
conventions. Even though initiatives in this regard do not specifi cally 
concern the Gulf of Aden, the Commission has acknowledged that IUU 
activities are easier when coastal states lack the resources to properly 
control their territorial waters, a typical feature of Somalia. 
The Commission states that IUU fi shing is not only a major threat 
to the sustainability of fi sh stocks and marine biodiversity, but also a 
distorting factor regarding competition among EU fi shermen, leading to 
lower market prices, loss of market share and a threat to the viability of 
EC companies.37 However, it must be acknowledged that, in line with the 
globalisation of the economy, the use of fl ags of convenience by European 
ship-owners has risen with a view to reducing costs in registration fees, 
labour conditions and taxes. Third countries tolerating fl ags of conven-
ience benefi t in turn from tax revenues and the possible creation of jobs. 
These States (mostly developing countries) lack the means to carry out 
effective control measures, or the will to do so, if the resources concerned 
are not theirs.
Accusations of IUU fi shing have often been levelled at European ves-
sels operating in the Gulf of Aden and off the south-eastern coast of So-
malia but, given the strict rules regulating fi shing in EU countries, the 
process is more complex. It usually takes place in two stages. First, a ship 
fl ying a fl ag of convenience of a third country that tolerates IUU fi shing, 
but which is owned by a European company, catches fi shery products 
that can be considered as IUU but which are not Community goods yet. 
In the subsequent stage, IUU catches are transhipped to an EC vessel of 
the same European company, becoming then regular Community fi shery 
products, ready to enter the EU for distribution. A thorough control of 
transhipments (either in port or in territorial waters) and landing, as well 
as traceability of fi shery products is thus essential to deter such ‘pirate 
fi shermen’ from operating.
37  <http://ec.europa.eu/fi sheries/cfp/external_relations/illegal_fi shing/q_a_en.htm>.
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In September 2007, the Commission put forward a proposal38 with a 
view to closing the doors of the EU to illegal fi shery products and vessels. 
The Council adopted Regulation 1005/2008 on 29 September 200839 fol-
lowing a consultation procedure. This is to enter into force on 1 January 
2010. The new Community rules governing access to Community ports 
for fi shing vessels fl ying the fl ag of a third country have been further 
strengthened to ensure stringent control of the legality of fi shery prod-
ucts landed by such fi shing vessels. The basic principle is the prohibition 
of importing fi shery products obtained from IUU fi shing into the Commu-
nity.40 To ensure its effectiveness, full traceability of all fi shery products 
traded with the Community is sought. Access to Community ports is 
denied in principle to third-country fi shing vessels unless they provide 
accurate information on the legality of their catches by means of a ‘catch 
certifi cate’ validated by the fl ag State and ensuring that ‘catches have 
been made in accordance with applicable laws, regulations and interna-
tional conservation and management measures’.41
In addition, Regulation 1005/2008 sets strict rules with a view to 
preventing irregular transhipments between third-country vessels and 
EC vessels. These can only take place in ports, with transfers in Com-
munity waters being explicitly prohibited.42 Moreover, the Commission is 
entrusted with the responsibility of establishing a Community IUU ves-
sel list. This blacklist shall include EC and third-country fi shing vessels 
involved in IUU fi shing whose fl ag States have not complied with offi cial 
requests addressed by the Commission to take all necessary measures 
against them. Regarding fl ag States, the Council, acting by a qualifi ed 
majority on a proposal from the Commission, will establish a list of non-
co-operating States43 against whom a set of counter-measures is listed 
in Article 38.44 Finally, a stricter scheme of inspections is envisaged in 
38  European Commission, Proposal for a Council regulation establishing a Community 
system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fi shing, COM 
(2007) 602 fi nal, 17 October 2007.
39  Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter 
and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fi shing (2008) OJ L286/1. 
40  Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 (n 39) art 12.1.
41  Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 (n 39) art 12.3.
42  Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 (n 39) art 4.3.
43  Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 (n 39) art 33.1.
44  The range of measures includes prohibition of importation into the EC of fi shery products 
caught under the fl ag of such states (catch certifi cates issued by national authorities will no 
longer be accepted), prohibition of purchase of their vessels by EC operators, prohibition of 
refl agging of EC vessels to such countries, prohibition of concluding chartering agreements 
with MS, prohibition of exportation of EC fi shing vessels to those countries, prohibition of 
joint fi shing operations, denunciation of any standing bilateral fi sheries agreements, and 
blocking of negotiations for bilateral fi sheries agreements or partnership agreements with 
the EC.
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Article 9, whereby ‘Member States shall carry out inspections in their 
designated ports of at least 5% of landing and transhipment operations 
by third country fi shing vessels each year’. However, suspected vessels45 
shall be subject to verifi cations in all cases.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the new regime applicable to IUU 
fi shing will largely depend, on the one hand, on the implementation rules 
(yet to be adopted by the Commission as of July 2009), and on the other, 
on the commitment of those MS benefi ting indirectly from IUU practices 
to put an end to such practices.
A major EU contribution to the security of fi sh supplies in coastal 
communities, as well as a deterrent to European vessels illegally fi shing 
off the Somali coast, would be the negotiation and signature of a Fisher-
ies Partnership Agreement with Somalia. But the Commission does not 
deem it feasible, given the various shortcomings faced by the TFG in 
terms of stability and administrative capacity.46 
2.2. Conventional foreign policy against piracy: the ‘modest 
although realistic’ EU NAVFOR-Somalia 
An overview of ESDP missions
The EU’s inability to react promptly and suitably to the Kosovo cri-
sis raised a wave of frustration in most European capitals that in 1999 
brought about the necessary agreement to launch an ESDP that would 
pursue objectives related to peace-keeping, humanitarian relief and res-
cue operations, common known as Petersberg missions. 
The impact of the ESDP on the nature of the EU as a global actor 
has been discussed thoroughly and we will not dwell on it here. Suffi ce 
it to say that ‘military’ scholars tend to stress the increased co-operation 
in the fi elds of capabilities, interoperability and deployability to assert 
that the EU is moving ‘from a predominantly “civilian” CFSP to a much 
more muscular and “harder” common defence policy’,47 whereas ‘civilian’ 
scholars usually highlight the fact that military instruments serve goals 
45  Article 9.2 lists as suspected vessels those engaged in activities that may be considered 
as IUU fi shing and that are sighted by a competent authority of a Member State, vessels 
reported in the framework of a notifi cation made under the Community alert system against 
IUU fi shing, vessels presumed by the Commission to have engaged in IUU fi shing, and 
fi shing vessels appearing on an IUU vessel list adopted by a regional fi sheries management 
organisation.
46  J Borg (Commissioner for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs) ‘Combating Piracy: Strength in 
Unity’, Speech at the Seminar on piracy and armed robbery against shipping, Brussels, 21 
January 2009, SPEECH/09/14.
47  J Howorth, ‘From Security to Defence: the Evolution of the CFSP’ in C Hill and M Smith 
(eds), International Relations and the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2005) 179.
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that on the whole remain civilian.48 Similarly, the nature of most ESDP 
operations to date has been solely civilian.49 The truth is, as Keukeleire 
points out, that the ‘ESDP quantitatively changed the nature of CFSP 
from a declaratory foreign policy focused on diplomacy to a more action-
orientated [one] ... [a]nd although still limited in scope, the EU fi nally 
ha[s] boots on the ground.’50
The fundamental basis for ESDP missions can be found in the CFSP 
objectives, as stated in Article 11 TEU, which cover the safeguarding of 
the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity 
of the EU in accordance with the UN Charter; the strengthening of the 
security of the EU; the preservation of peace and the strengthening of in-
ternational security; the promotion of international co-operation; and the 
development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, as well 
as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Article 17 TEU makes a sole reference to ESDP missions, though 
rather implicitly, when stating that ‘[q]uestions referred to in this Ar-
ticle shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks 
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemak-
ing.’ Apart from the general scope of these operations, no further specifi c 
question (eg decision-making or fi nancing) is dealt with in the Treaty and 
the answer must be found in general CFSP provisions applying to joint 
actions (the legal instrument used to regulate ESDP missions), bearing in 
mind that a number of restrictions will apply to possible military aspects 
of the operation.
The process of launching an ESDP mission is complex and involves 
many actors both at the European and national level. Co-ordination with 
third States or other international organisations is vital. As far as deci-
sion-making is concerned,51 the origin of an ESDP mission is an early 
warning triggered either by the Policy Unit and the Situation Centre in 
Brussels or by national FP ministries through their Permanent repre-
sentations. A number of Council working groups will then be asked for 
advice by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Committee on 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), the Politico-Military 
48  KE Smith, EU Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Polity Press, Cambridge 2008) 72-3.
49  While 12 ESDP missions have been of a civilian nature, only 5 ESDP missions have 
been strictly military operations: Concordia (Macedonia), Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 
Artemis (Congo), EUFOR-Congo and EUFOR-Chad (‘Aperçu des missions et opérations de 
l’Union européenne en juin 2008’ (2008) ESDP Newsletter (6) 30 <www.consilium.europa.
eu/esdp>). EU NAVFOR Somalia can now be added to this list. 
50  Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (n 24) 57. 
51  The following considerations are largely based on the decision-making process as de-
scribed by H Hazelzet, ‘Human Rights Aspects of EU Crisis Management Operations: from 
Nuisance to Necessity’ (2006) 13 International Peacekeeping 565.
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Group (PMG), and advisors on the fi nancial aspects of CFSP. The Council 
Secretariat carries out the planning tasks while ensuring co-ordination 
between civilian and military operational instruments and structures. At 
the same time, MS internally assess their possible contribution to the op-
eration, be it through expertise, military facilities, personnel, equipment 
or fi nancial means. In addition, complementary measures will possibly 
be adopted by the Commission through fi nancial tools in the framework 
of EC development policy. A fact-fi nding mission may also be sent to re-
port on the situation on the ground.
On the basis of the different reports gathered, the PSC may recom-
mend to the Council the launching of an ESDP mission. Should this 
occur, a Joint Action is prepared for adoption by the Council to regulate 
the legal aspects of the operation. A parallel operational plan details the 
respective tasks and obligations of all the subjects involved. In the case of 
a military operation, the rules of engagement are also specifi ed. MS start 
sending national contingents to the theatre of operations and, within fi ve 
days of the Council decision, the EU can be present on the ground.52
As regards the fi nancing of ESDP missions, Article 28 TEU sets some 
basic rules: expenditure will be charged to the general EC budget by de-
fault, apart from two cases (paragraph 3): ‘operating expenditure arising 
from operations having military or defence implications’ and ‘cases where 
the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.’ Practical implemen-
tation of this general principle with regard to ESDP missions has led to a 
differentiation between two situations. 
On the one hand, purely civilian crisis-management operations are 
funded from the CFSP budgetary line of the EC general budget (Chapter 
19 03), and therefore follow the budgetary procedure laid down in Ar-
ticle 272 of the EC Treaty. The signifi cant role played by the European 
Parliament in this procedure, as well as the European Court of Auditors’ 
competences as regards budgetary management control should never be 
neglected. Budgetary implementation is in the hands of the Commission, 
in line with Article 274 of the EC Treaty, and the CFSP budget is no 
exception. When a Joint Action is adopted, the Commission commits, 
contracts and disburses the budget allocated to the ESDP mission. This 
procedure has applied to the majority of operations so far, as well as to 
the civilian aspects of missions with military implications.
On the other hand, purely military operations are fi nanced through 
a special mechanism named Athena, established by the Council in 2004. 
Athena was set up to administer the fi nancing of common costs of opera-
tions having military or defence implications. Athena is endowed with 
52  Hazelzet (n 51) 566.
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legal capacity and has a permanent structure. A Special Committee is 
tasked with the management of common costs from the preparatory 
phase to the termination of each military operation. The Council Decision 
establishing Athena53 embraced a rather restrictive interpretation of the 
common costs to be fi nanced under this scheme. Consequently, the ratio 
of costs fi nanced in common to total incremental costs for an operation is 
small (less than 10%). The remaining expenditure is fi nanced directly by 
MS on the basis of the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle.54 
It might happen, though, that both procedures intertwine in a spe-
cifi c operation for the sake of effi ciency. For instance, in 2005, 6 MS vol-
untarily fi nanced, through Athena, specifi c common costs over the fi rst 
two months of the EUSEC-Congo operation until the CFSP budgetary 
allocations were made available.
The fi rst ESDP operation was the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which ran from January 2003 to December 2006, although 
the fi rst purely military operation was Operation Concordia in Macedo-
nia, which started in March 2003. Since then, more than 20 missions 
have been launched on three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). In 
spite of the varying and evolving nature and scope of ESDP missions, 
there are three elements upon which MS seem to agree: fi rst, ESDP mis-
sions display a collective character, leading to the implicit rejection of 
unilateral interventions; second, the cover of the UNSC is deemed essen-
tial for the legitimacy of the mission not to be contested; and third, the 
existence of limits regarding the humanitarian mission’s goals and their 
implementation.55   
The legal basis and scope of EU NAVFOR-Somalia
The legal basis for European military intervention off the coast of So-
malia was provided at the international level mainly by two Resolutions of 
the UNSC. The fi rst was Resolution 1816 (2008),56 which authorised, for 
a period of six months starting on 2 June, States co-operating with the 
TFG to enter the territorial waters of Somalia in order to repress acts of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
53  Council Decision 2007/384/CFSP of 14 May 2007 establishing a mechanism to admin-
ister the fi nancing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or 
defence implications (Athena) [2007] OJ L 152/14.
54  Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (n 24) 115-6.
55  C Diaz Barrado, ‘Las denominadas « intervenciones de humanidad » y la Unión Euro-
pea’, in A Del Valle (ed), Los nuevos escenarios internacionales y europeos del Derecho de la 
seguridad (Escuela Diplomática/AEPDIRI/BOE, Madrid 2003) 145.
56  UNSC Res 1816 (2 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1816. 
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The SC acted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
aim of which is to authorise the use of armed force to bring to an end threats 
to international peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression. Resorting 
to this dynamic on the part of non-State actors has become a consolidated 
practice in the decade since UNSC Resolution 1333 (2000) took fi nancial ac-
tion against the Taliban and included Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation. 
However, its application to piracy proves the seriousness attached to pirate 
attacks in the Horn of Africa. In addition, as Pozo points out,57 recourse to 
Chapter VII has also been common in justifying humanitarian intervention 
in failed States since UNSC Resolution 794 (1992) on Somalia.  
UNSC Resolution 1816 established two conditions for naval military 
intervention in the territorial waters of Somalia: one formal, that the TFG 
would provide advance notifi cation to the UN Secretary-General; and one 
substantial, that means used in the fi ght against pirates should be con-
sistent with relevant international law. 
UNSC Resolution 183858 went a major step further in early October 
by inviting ‘…States interested in the security of maritime activities to 
take part actively in the fi ght against piracy on the high seas off the coast 
of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, 
in accordance with international law’ (particularly, the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, UNCLOS). It also recommended 
that States issue vessels with ‘advice and guidance on appropriate pre-
cautionary measures to protect themselves from attack or actions to take’ 
in the event of a pirate attack, an addition that raised concerns among 
the maritime community about the ability of States to provide effective 
protection against pirates. Following Resolution 1838, the Council of the 
EU decided to offi cially launch the fi rst ever European naval mission. 
The UNSC warmly welcomed this initiative in December by means 
of Resolution 184659 and substantially toughened its tone regarding the 
fi ght against piracy: 
9. [The UNSC c]alls upon States and regional organizations that have 
the capacity to do so, to take part actively in the fi ght against piracy 
… by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, and through sei-
zure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equip-
ment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery off the 
coast of Somalia …
57  P Pozo Serrano, ‘Estados fallidos, derecho internacional humanitario y seguridad inter-
nacional’ in C Ramón Chornet (ed), Los retos humanitarios del siglo XXI (Tirant lo Blanch, 
Valencia 2004) 181.
58  UNSC Res 1838 (7 October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1838.
59  UNSC Res 1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846.
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and authorised, for an initial period of 12 months, the use of force against 
pirates within the territorial waters of Somalia. 
10. [The UNSC d]ecides that for a period of 12 months from the date 
of this resolution States and regional organizations cooperating with 
the TFG in the fi ght against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of Somalia, for which advance notifi cation has been provided 
by the TFG to the Secretary-General, may:
(a) Enter into the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of 
repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner 
consistent with [action permitted by UNCLOS for the repression of 
piracy on the high seas]
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consist-
ent with [action permitted by UNCLOS for the repression of piracy 
on the high seas], all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea;
In doing so, the UNSC temporarily established a specifi c derogation 
from UNCLOS, whose defi nition of piracy omits attacks committed in the 
territorial waters of a State. According to Article 101 UNCLOS:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private 
ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
1. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against per-
sons or property on board such ship or aircraft,  
2. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State. 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or air-
craft;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described 
in subparagraph (a) or (b).
To understand the serious concerns invoked by certain European 
States, this provision must be linked to Article 106 regulating liability for 
seizure without adequate grounds and establishing that:
Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has 
been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizu-
re shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by 
the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.
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Although the questions raised by the prosecution of arrested pirates 
will be dealt with in the next section, mention should be made of UNSC 
Resolution 1851 of 16 December 2008.60 The UNSC invited all States and 
regional organisations involved
… to conclude special agreements or arrangements with countries 
willing to take custody of pirates in order to embark law enforce-
ment offi cials (“shipriders”) from the latter countries, in particular 
countries in the region, to facilitate the investigation and prosecu-
tion of persons detained as a result of operations conducted under 
this resolution for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of Somalia, provided that the advance consent of the TFG is 
obtained for the exercise of third state jurisdiction by shipriders in 
Somali territorial waters …
Regarding the European legal basis for military intervention, the 
Council fi rst created a co-ordination cell in Brussels (EU NAVCO) on 19 
September as the fi rst step towards the fi rst European maritime inter-
vention, code-named EU NAVFOR-Atalanta. EU-NAVCO comprised 4 of-
fi cials, entrusted with the task of co-ordinating the EU military in order 
‘to support the activities of MS deploying military assets in theatre’.61 
MS were invited to ‘provide the EU Coordination Cell with any relevant 
information on their operational activities in theatre and on the current 
situation in the area, including exchanges of information with merchant 
vessels’.62 The Head of EU NAVCO was tasked with co-ordination at the 
operational level with the relevant departments of the UN-Secretariat, 
the WFP and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).63 Political 
co-ordination with other international actors was ensured by the Secre-
tary General/High Representative (SG/HR) Javier Solana, who acts as 
the primary point of contact with the UN and the African Union (AU). The 
Head of EU NAVCO was politically accountable to the Political and Secu-
rity Committee (PSC) of the Council. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) 
was asked to monitor the military aspects of co-ordination.64 EU NAVCO 
was closed once EU NAVFOR-Atalanta was fully operative.
On 11 November 2008, the Council of the European Union offi cially 
launched Operation Atalanta by means of Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP65 
60  UNSC Res 1851 (16 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1851.
61  Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP of 19 September 2008 on the European Union 
military coordination action in support of UNSC Res 1816 (2008) (EU NAVCO) [2008] OJ L 
252/39 art 2.
62  Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP (n 61) art 8.2.
63  Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP (n 61) art 9.
64  Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP (n 61) art 7.
65  Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union mili-
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(JA). According to Article 1 JA, the mandate of the mission is to contribute 
to the protection of vessels cruising off the Somali coast. Vessels of the 
World Food Programme (WPF) delivering food aid to displaced persons in 
Somalia are mentioned in fi rst place, in line with UNSC Resolution 1814 
(2008), and then, at least formally, other vulnerable vessels, irrespective 
of their nationality. 
The mandate of the operation is detailed in Article 2 JA. Depending 
on availabilities, EU-NAVFOR is entitled to:
(a) protect vessels chartered by the WFP, particularly when sailing 
in Somali territorial waters. This protection can include presence on 
board such vessels;
(b) protect merchant vessels in the areas where it is deployed, based 
on a case-by-case evaluation of needs;
(c) keep watch over areas off the Somali coast, including Somalia’s 
territorial waters, in which there are dangers to maritime activities, 
in particular to maritime traffi c;
(d) take necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, 
prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and 
armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is 
present;
(e) arrest, detain and transfer piracy suspects, and seize the vessels 
of pirates, as well as goods on board;
(f) liaise with other actors working in the region to combat acts of 
piracy off the Somali coast. Specifi c mention is made of co-operation 
with the ‘Combined Task Force 150’ maritime force which operates 
within the framework of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’.
Participating MS in EU-NAVFOR to date are the UK, Greece, France, 
Germany,66 Spain,67 Italy and Sweden.68 Belgium and the Netherlands 
will join at a later stage.69 
tary operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy 
and armed robbery off the Somali coasts [2008] OJ L301/33.
66  The German Bundestag (whose support is required to send troops abroad) gave its 
consent on 19 December 2008. Germany’s contribution is the frigate FGS Rheinland Pfalz, 
which allows a multi-role capability (it includes two helicopters). 
67  The Spanish Parliament approved participation in Atalanta on 20 January 2009. Its con-
tribution is the frigate SS Victoria, which has anti-ship missiles and two helicopters. Spain 
exercises command of the EU mission from April to August 2009 and will then be relieved 
by a Dutch warship.
68  The Swedish government gave its overwhelming support to Atalanta in February 2009. 
Three Swedish corvettes joined European forces in the theatre of operations in June 2009.
69 <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090325FactsheetEUNAVFOR%20
Somalia-version4_EN.pdf>.
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The Danish case should be carefully looked at. Denmark is faced 
with a diffi cult dilemma. On one hand, this MS benefi ts from an opt-out 
clause in defence matters, in accordance with Article 6 of the Protocol on 
the position of Denmark annexed to the TEU. Danish representatives ac-
cordingly leave the Council meeting room whenever defence issues are on 
the agenda, and it is the only MS that does not take part in the European 
Defence Agency (EDA).70 On the other hand, as it is a major seafaring 
nation, Danish vessels and fi shermen have also been the target of pirate 
attacks in the Gulf of Aden71 and the Danish Royal Navy has been patrol-
ling the area since September 2008 within the framework of the NATO 
effort to stem pirate attacks. As of December 2008, Denmark was leading 
the naval Combined Task Force-150 as part of the Enduring Peace NATO 
Operation. Notwithstanding this fact, Denmark does not participate in 
the EU military response.72
In addition, support from third States for EU-NAVFOR is also fore-
seen in Article 10 JA 2008/749/CFSP, a provision tailored to provide for 
Norwegian intervention. Being a third State, Norway is currently co-oper-
ating with the EU in defence matters and benefi ts from an Administrative 
Agreement with the EDA that allows for its participation in joint projects. 
In contrast with Denmark, the Norwegian government has decided to 
contribute to Operation Atalanta with a frigate which should join the 
European force in the area by August 2009.73 Switzerland has also ex-
pressed an interest in participating.74
A not so ‘robust mandate’: critical shortcomings remain unresolved
On 17 December 2008, the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, defended the ESDP Atalanta mission before the Bundestag 
saying that German marine forces would have ‘a solid mandate which … 
70  ML Sanchez Barrueco, ‘L’Agence européenne de défense: un organe intergouvernemental 
au service d’une institution communautaire?’ (2008) Revue du droit de l’Union européenne 
529.
71  The Danish freighter CEC Future and its entire crew were safely released in January 
2009 after a ransom was delivered.
72  JA 2008/749/CFSP, preamble, recital 8. 
73  Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Press release 5/2009, 27 February 2009, <http://www.
regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/press-centre/Press-releases/2009/norwegian-frigate-to-join-
eu-navfor-atal.html?id=547266>.
74  According to EU Council press room, 3 March 2009 <http://consilium.europa.eu/show-
Page.aspx?id=1567&lang=EN>. Switzerland obviously has no navy, but fearing that EU 
protection to Swiss vessels would not reach the same level as that ships from the UN or 
EU receive (30% of Swiss-bound goods pass through the Gulf of Aden) if only a fi nancial 
contribution was offered, the Swiss government was discussing in February 2009 whether 
to send up to 30 elite troops, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/search/Result.html?siteSect
=882&ty=st&sid=10347320>.
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gives [them] the necessary room for manoeuvre against the pirates off the 
coast of Somalia’.75 The German Defence Minister, Franz Josef Jung, did 
the same thing when sending off the frigate Karlsruhe: the EU naval mili-
tary mission had an unprecedented ‘robust mandate’. Similar statements 
were carefully leaked to the press and a climate of satisfaction spread as 
warships participating in the mission joined up in the waters off Somalia.
The initial news was promising indeed. Only a week after the mis-
sion started operations, the German frigate taking part in EU-NAVFOR 
successfully thwarted a pirate attack.76 In addition, the Maritime Secu-
rity Center-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) was established to provide advice 
to merchant shipping companies on self-protection measures.77 A month 
later, EU NAVFOR presented itself as making ‘a real difference in counter-
piracy’.78
Regarding protection to vessels chartered by the WPF, EU NAVFOR 
made public statistics according to which 19 vessels had been escorted 
by March 2009, with the result that more than 121,000 tonnes of food 
were delivered safely each day to a population amounting to 1.6 million.79 
As far as protection of merchant shipping is concerned, several success-
ful outcomes have been reported since the fi rst pirate engagement involv-
ing a German EU NAVFOR frigate and an Egyptian vessel on 25 Decem-
ber 2008,80 and hijackings dropped substantially over the fi rst quarter of 
2009. In all cases, either the naval operation website itself or the national 
Ministries of Defence, or both, were quick to applaud with press releases 
the impressive implementation of the mission by European navies. 
75  <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/081217-
steinmeier-Atalanta-bundestag.html>.
76  EU-NAVFOR Press release, 25 December 2008, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cmsUpload/081226_1st_pirate_engagement.pdf>.
77  The MSCHOA was set by the Council as an element of EU NAVFOR. As a co-ordination 
centre, MSCHOA aims to picture the situation of vulnerable shipping in the Indian Ocean. 
In order to do so, its website (<www. mschoa.eu>) offers, upon secure registration, updated 
information about vessels and guidance to ship-owners, ships’ masters and agents, with a 
view to reducing the risk of pirate attacks.
78  EU-NAVFOR press release, 30 January 2009 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cmsUpload/105728.pdf>.
79  EU NAVFOR Factsheet 04/2009, March 2009 <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsUpload/090325FactsheetEUNAVFOR%20Somalia-version4_EN.pdf>.
80  The following list is by no means exhaustive: a Spanish EU NAVFOR frigate 
foiled the hijacking of a UAE merchant ship <http://www.mde.es/NotasPrensa?id_
nodo=4072&accion=1&id_nota=1946&id_vis=1946>, a German frigate prevented the hi-
jacking of a besieged German steel cargo vessel on 3 March 2009 <http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/106500.pdf>, a French frigate as-
sisted a hundred victims of traffi cking in persons who had been held in a supposed pirate 
mothership on 19 March <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Floreal.
pdf>, and a Spanish frigate prevented a Spanish cargo vessel from suffering an attack on 10 
April <http://www.mde.es/NotasPrensa?id_nodo=4072&accion=1&id_nota=1997>.
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However, life cannot be always a bed of roses in the Indian Ocean. 
Even the military units of Atalanta have been forced to repel pirate at-
tacks on themselves.81 In addition, the end of the winter monsoon in 
March should discourage the often used statistical analysis of the fre-
quency and scale of pirate attacks. The increase of attacks in April82 re-
inforces the belief that the earlier decline was due to bad weather rather 
than the presence of European warships.
We consider that several drawbacks undermine EU NAVFOR’s ca-
pacity to live up to expectations. Given that the scope of protection is 
limited, with the exception of WFP vessels, Atalanta’s mandate is more 
realistic than robust. Similarly, the boundaries concerning the use of 
force in the case of engagement with pirates have not been clearly defi ned 
and widespread confusion over the prosecution of pirates has given rise 
to confl ict and inconsistencies between certain MS and others. Finally, 
both the fi nancial envelope and the military assets assigned to Atalanta 
seem rather limited. All these weaknesses will be assessed next. 
a) A realistic mandate given the territorial scope 
Article 2 JA asks EU NAVFOR to provide protection ‘to merchant 
vessels cruising in the areas where it is deployed’. The truth is that the 
area covered by the mission is far too large to be covered by a few frigates 
and corvettes. Military authorities have repeatedly stated that guarantee-
ing protection to every single ship transiting the area is impossible. The 
biggest catch to date, the Saudi supertanker Sirius Star, was actually 
seized 800 km off the Kenyan coast. An awareness campaign was thus 
carried out among the merchant shipping community, requesting that 
vessels adopt a responsible attitude and follow instructions given by the 
MSCHOA. 
In addition, the scope of protection extended to merchant vessels 
is limited because intervention will not be triggered automatically in the 
event of an attack but will be decided ‘on a case-by-case basis’. This crite-
rion might suggest that ships carrying a European fl ag would prevail but 
to date this assumption has not proven to be correct. In fact, Atalanta’s 
fi rst pirate engagement took place when a German frigate came to the 
81  A German naval tanker taking part in Atalanta was subjected to an attack by a skiff with 
seven pirates on 29 March 2009 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/en/esdp/106976.pdf>. A Spanish frigate helped to detain the skiff after-
wards, <http://www.mde.es/NotasPrensa?id_nodo=4072&accion=1&id_nota=1986&id_
vis=1986>.
82  Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Somali Pirates seize fi ve ships in 48 Hours’ New York Times (6 April 
2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/world/africa/07pirates.html?ref=africa>. 
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aid of an Egyptian bulk carrier that was at risk.83 ‘Case-by-case’ engage-
ment means basically that EUNAVFOR forces will intervene solely when 
the distance to the location of a pirate attack makes intervention possible 
and effective.
Apart from spontaneous assistance to ships in danger, protection 
has taken the form of escorts (in the case of WFP vessels) or convoys (in 
the case of merchant vessels). Atalanta provides naval escorts to all WFP 
vessels, which usually sail from Mombassa or Tanzania towards Somali 
ports. Article 2 a) JA permits an armed presence on board these vessels 
to guarantee protection. Regarding merchant ships, a ‘safer transit cor-
ridor’ was established off the Yemeni coast in the Gulf of Aden, where 
over 90 percent of pirate attacks occurred in 2007 and 2008. Four points 
are pinpointed along the corridor and merchant ships registered with the 
MSCHOA can join the convoy at any one of them in order to successfully 
reach the Suez Canal.
This scheme omits fi shermen. Tuna fi shing vessels, in particular, are 
forced to stay off the southern coast of Somalia, where the bulk of their 
annual catch is caught from April to November each year. Therefore, the 
‘safer transit corridor’ in the Gulf of Aden is not useful for this economic 
sector and they remain subject to pirate attacks. On the recommenda-
tion of the EU NAVFOR Commander, Atalanta’s theatre of operations was 
extended in May 2009 to respond to increasing pirate threats in the area 
surrounding the Seychelles archipelago, but the result of this decision 
has yet to be seen, since it has not been accompanied by the reinforce-
ment of military assets on the ground.
b) The limited capacity to use force against pirates 
The legitimacy of the use of force within the framework of humani-
tarian intervention is not unanimously accepted at the European level. 
Whereas some MS, namely France, have displayed a very active position 
in favour of the right to humanitarian intervention and therefore the le-
gitimacy per se of military operations pursuing the objective of saving hu-
man lives, others have not played such a signifi cant role. Consequently, 
it would seem that a common European position in this respect does not 
exist, but rather a combination of positions assumed by different MS 
within the framework of their respective national foreign policies.84 This 
explains, to a certain extent, the ambiguities and doubts that seem to tie 
the hands of Operation Atalanta when it comes to resorting to force.
83  <http://www.mschoa.eu/display.aspx?articlename=27>.
84  Diaz Barrado (n 55) 144.
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Article 2 JA states that, faced with a pirate attack, the military per-
sonnel involved in the operation can ‘take the necessary measures, in-
cluding the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring 
to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery’. An accurate interpreta-
tion of this provision is essential in understanding EU NAVFOR’s scope 
and, consequently, its limitations. The Joint Action permits a military 
response as long as it deters, prevents or intervenes to bring to an end a 
pirate attack. Provided UNCLOS is observed, EU NAVFOR warships can 
even sink pirate skiffs during an attack. But the JA does not enable EU 
NAVFOR to bomb, for instance, coastal cities of Somaliland and Puntland 
where pirates re-supply. However, we should recall that Article 6 of UNSC 
Resolution 1851 allowed (in December 2008) for intervention ‘in Soma-
lia’ for the purpose of countering piracy, pursuant to the request of the 
TFG. A reform of the JA would thus be required, should the need arise to 
broaden the scope of the European mission. 
Likewise, the possibility of resorting to force once an attack is over 
and the pirates have sailed away is not so clear in the JA. Since pirate 
attacks happen in an extremely short period of time, a European war-
ship will probably get to the scene when the pirates have already either 
hijacked the vessel or robbed it and escaped. This situation is unlikely 
to meet the requirements of an engagement on the grounds of legitimate 
defence. As a result, fi shermen’s associations have expressed their con-
cerns about the ability of European forces to deter pirate attacks so long 
as they have no recourse to more coercive measures. Pirates will thus 
become more audacious because nobody retaliates.85
The former Head of EU NAVCO clearly stated that the decision on 
a military response after a ship had been seized by pirates could not be 
taken on the spot by the commanding offi cer on his own, as higher level 
co-ordination was required.86 As a result, the legal framework makes the 
situation on the frontline rather confusing. In addition, there are differ-
ences in MS legislation with regard to the use of force on international 
missions.87 The EU does not seem interested in handling a pirate crisis in 
a similar way to the US’s determination after the seizure of the Maersk-
85  Europa Press 3 October 2008.
86  Interview with Andrés Breijo (Head of EU NAVCO) El Correo (Bilbao 21 September 
2008).
87  In light of the launch of Operation Atalanta, a German law had to be amended. The law 
prohibited the navy from engaging in policing missions or spontaneous rescue missions. As 
a result, a German navy frigate spent months sailing off the coast of Somalia while various 
freighters were being hijacked, and yet the Bundeswehr could not authorise action. Udo 
Ludwig and Holger Stark, ‘German Shipowner Paid Ransom to Somali Pirates’ Der Spiegel 
(16 September 2008) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,578495,00.
html>.
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Alabama in early April 2009, though Middleton suggests that ‘custom-
ary international law provides basic principles governing the appropriate 
amount of force to be used where it is lawful to stop and arrest a ship at 
sea’ in Article 101 UNCLOS.88
In the event of a pirate attack, gathering enough evidence of the 
crime has become a precondition for pursuing the pirates. The lack of an 
effective central government in Somalia which is willing and able to take 
legal action against European warships does not entitle EU NAVFOR to 
carry out unlawful searches, arrests or seizures. Hitches following en-
gagements without suffi cient evidence have publicly exposed Atalanta’s 
limitations, as will be explained in the following two sections.
c) The arrest of pirates by EU-led forces and the applicability of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law.
Beyond the question of whether or not EU-NAVFOR’s rules of en-
gagement limit the goal of deterring piracy, the recourse to force by an 
ESDP mission raises a far-reaching question, that of the liability of Eu-
ropean peacekeeping operations under international humanitarian law 
(IHL) and human rights law. 
This matter cannot be tackled without some prior refl ections on the 
Union’s international legal personality. International personality enables 
States or other entities such as international organisations to assume 
rights and obligations at the international level. Article 281 of the EC 
Treaty originally conferred legal personality on the European Community 
but no similar provision was foreseen in the Treaty of Maastricht to cover 
the activities of the newborn European Union. Articles 1-7 of the Consti-
tutional Treaty corrected this irregular situation and, despite its unfortu-
nate outcome, the same spirit was preserved in Article 47 of the Lisbon 
Treaty in an equally laconic way (‘The Union shall have legal personality’). 
However, until the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, the EU will not fully 
enjoy international legal personality. 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, scholars essentially agree that the 
EU benefi ts from some kind of de facto legal personality enabling it to 
carry out certain tasks at the international level independently of MS.89 
Many examples illustrate this. Suffi ce it to mention that, with respect to 
ESDP missions, agreements on the status of EU-led armed forces operat-
88  R Middleton, ‘Briefi ng Note: Pirates and How to Deal with them’ Chatham House (22 
April 2009) 3. 
89  N Tsagourias, ‘The Application of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law to EU Peace-
keeping Operations and the Union’s International Responsibility’ in M Trybus and ND White 
(eds), European Security Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 116.  
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ing as part of a peacekeeping operation are signed by the EU and not by 
MS sitting in the framework of the Council.90 
We mentioned before that international legal personality covers the 
ability to be the subject of rights and obligations. The de facto ability to 
be the subject of rights is awarded provided that other international ac-
tors do not contest the tasks fulfi lled by the EU at the international level. 
However, it is diffi cult to answer questions concerning the enforcement of 
the obligations and liability of international organisations following a de 
facto interpretation. Recognition of the international responsibility of the 
EU should be explicitly stated in European legal instruments. 
There are several indicators pointing to the EU being bound by IHL 
when launching ESDP missions, even though the EU is not a party to the 
1907 Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Within the 
framework of public international law, the fact that armed forces operating 
in a multinational mission must comply with IHL norms is by no means a 
new question. It is widely understood that international organisations en-
joying a subjective capacity to send troops on the ground in conformity with 
their constitutional objectives and functions must, accordingly, be bound 
by the law of armed confl ict.91 Not specifi cally targeting the European Un-
ion, the Institut de droit international in The Hague stated in 1999 that 
every party to an armed confl ict in which non-state entities take 
part, independently of their legal status, as well as the United Na-
tions and the regional organisations and other competent interna-
tional organisations, must respect international humanitarian law 
and fundamental human rights.92
The IHL rules referred to are those offi cially recognised as interna-
tional customary law, as Gasser points out with regard to the UN:
[the UN not being a party to the Geneva Conventions] does not mean 
… that troops in a UN-led peace operation are free to behave as they 
wish. International customary law does apply to the ‘United Nations 
in action’, as it does to any other international player.93 
90  Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Djibouti on the status of 
the European Union-led forces in the Republic of Djibouti in the framework of the EU mili-
tary operation Atalanta [2009], OJ L33/43; Agreement between the European Union and 
the Somali Republic on the status of the European Union-led forces in the Somali Republic 
in the framework of the EU military operation Atalanta [2009], OJ L10/29.
91  R Kolb, G Porretto and S Vité, L’application du droit international humanitaire et des 
droits de l’homme aux organisations internationales. Forces de paix et administrations civiles 
transitoires (Bruylant, Brussels 2005) 127.
92  Institut de droit international, Annuaire, (1999) 68-II art 2. 
93  HP Gasser, ‘From Military Intervention to Occupation of Territory’ in H Fischer, U Fr-
oissart, W Heintschel von Heinegg and C Raap (eds), Crisis Management and Humanitarian 
Protection (Berliner Wissenschafts Verlag, Berlin 2004) 145.
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The UN Secretary-General further clarifi ed this issue by means of 
a Bulletin entitled ‘Observance by United Nations forces of international 
humanitarian law’,94 which is essentially a codifi cation of the rules and 
customs deemed applicable to UN-led forces when they are actively en-
gaged in situations of armed confl ict as combatants, without prejudice to 
their responsibility as members of a national armed force bound by the 
international commitments of the sending State.95 These rules entered 
into force on 12 August 1999.
Similar refl ections can be made on EU-led forces. Scholars consider 
that the EU is bound by the obligation of customary law to respect and 
ensure respect for humanitarian law by military forces deployed on the 
ground. At the European level, this can be achieved mainly by means 
of proper guidance (the adoption of guidelines and instructions), proper 
supervision of seconded troops and, in the event of an alleged violation 
of IHL, a prompt reaction to bring it to an end. We agree with Tsagourias 
on the fact that ‘[t]roop-contributing states have similar obligations and 
this formula of overlapping obligations ensures respect of humanitar-
ian law’.96 However, the need for greater precision concerning respec-
tive responsibilities is deemed necessary to ensure adequate and effective 
criminal prosecution of any breach of IHL that might happen, especially 
on robust missions. If the Lisbon Treaty eventually enters into force, the 
legal personality of the EU should make it easier to invoke the interna-
tional responsibility of the organisation. 
Even if IHL rules are theoretically applicable to ESDP operations 
in one way or another, as has been concluded so far, analysis should 
be made on a case-by-case basis. As far as EU NAVFOR is concerned, 
the applicability of IHL to forces operating in the framework of Opera-
tion Atalanta is not clear. In the particular case of Somalia, it is worth 
noting that the situation off-shore does not meet the conditions for it 
to be considered an armed confl ict. Accordingly, arrested pirates may 
not invoke the status of prisoners of war according to the Third Geneva 
Convention,97 especially because they do not meet the requirements laid 
down in Article 4A. They are not members of the armed forces of a Party 
taking part in the confl ict or of militias or volunteers corps either. Neither 
are they members of other organised groups that fulfi l certain conditions 
(particularly the chain of command and the conduct of operations in ac-
cordance with the laws and customs of war). A certain parallelism may 
thus be established between arrested pirates and Al-Qaeda prisoners in 
94  Bulletin of the Secretary-General, ST/SGB/1999/13.
95  Bulletin of the Secretary-General (n 94) art 1.1.
96  Tsagourias (n 89) 121.
97  Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 12 August 1949.
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Guantanamo. These have not benefi ted from the status of prisoners of 
war, unlike Taliban detainees held at the same facility.98 Likewise, pirates 
do not easily fi t into either the defi nition or the intention of civilian popu-
lations to be protected against certain consequences of war in the sense 
of the IV Geneva Convention.99
The question of the need to adapt IHL to the armed confl icts of the 
21st century, which usually show the features of asymmetric warfare, as 
mentioned above, falls well beyond the scope of this article. Suffi ce it to 
say that the inapplicability of the law of armed confl ict (IHL) to the treat-
ment of pirates and their situation as detainees by EU NAVFOR-Somalia 
does not imply that these persons are completely deprived of their rights. 
Arrested pirates still benefi t from the protection offered by human rights 
law (HRL), with which European military forces must comply.
The simplest way to justify such a conclusion is to recall that although 
forces operating in the framework of EU NAVFOR act under the European 
fl ag, this can never be a way out of their responsibilities as armed forc-
es of a country signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). All States that are participants in the Atalanta operation, both MS 
and Norway, are parties to the ECHR, Article 1 of which states that ‘The 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms [enumerated in the Convention]’. Although the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR is a controversial issue, the ECJ 
ruling in the Issa case is particularly enlightening:
[A] state may also be held accountable for violation of the Conven-
tion rights and freedom of persons who are in the territory of another 
state but who are found to be under the former state’s authority and 
control ... Accountability in such situations stems from the fact that 
Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a 
state party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory 
of another state, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.100 
(emphasis added)
In addition, respect for HR is at the core of the European integration 
process as a general principle of law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union recognises a number of rights to persons irre-
spective of nationality, such as the prohibition of torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 4), the right to an effective 
98  R Bermejo, ‘Cuestiones en torno al estatuto jurídico de los detenidos en Guantánamo’ in 
C Ramón (ed), Los retos humanitarios del siglo XXI (Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2004) 62.
99  Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 12 
August 1949 Part II.
100  Issa v Turkey (App no 31821/96) (2004) EHRR 567. 
228 Maria Luisa Sanchez Barrueco: Refl ections on the EU Foreign Policy Objectives behind...
remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47), the presumption of innocence and 
the right to defence (Article 48), and so forth. This is not a legally bind-
ing document but a useful source of interpretation for ‘the courts of the 
Union and the Member States’.101          
d) Prosecution of arrested pirates, the bone of contention among 
Member States
According to Article 2 JA, EU NAVFOR is entitled to ‘arrest, detain 
and transfer’ suspects in cases of piracy or armed robbery. It may also 
‘seize the vessels’ and ‘the goods on board’ with a view to bringing them 
before a court. Article 12 JA deals with the prosecution of arrested sus-
pects. It is stated that, provided Somalia accepts, pirates and confi scated 
goods will be transferred to ‘the competent authorities of the fl ag Member 
State or of the third State participating in the operation, of the vessel 
which took them captive’. 
The arrest of suspected pirates has been a source of substantial 
disagreement among MS. Most of them have not wanted to take full re-
sponsibility for their prosecution. In some cases, it is a matter of national 
legislation. In Spain, for instance, piracy is not typifi ed by the Criminal 
Code. Therefore arrested pirates are not liable to appear before Spanish 
courts unless they are investigated under observance of the principle of 
universal justice, which allows serious crimes committed abroad to be 
prosecuted in Spain. In the Netherlands, there is an Anti-Piracy Act pun-
ishing such crimes with a 12-year sentence, but it had never been used 
until May 2009. In contrast, French national laws treat piracy, hostage-
taking and armed robbery at sea as a crime and arrested pirates can face 
life imprisonment. Some MS (eg Denmark and Germany) can only pros-
ecute pirates when they have attacked a national vessel or citizen.  
This state of affairs justifi ed the inclusion of a clause in Article 12 
JA whereby if a State that has arrested pirates ‘cannot, or does not wish 
to, exercise its jurisdiction,’ detainees can be transferred to whichever 
State, whether it is a member or not, wishes to exercise its jurisdiction 
over them. International law, notably international humanitarian law re-
mains the sole limit to this possibility, as stated in Article 12.2 JA, whose 
aim is to avoid suspected pirates being ‘subjected to the death penalty, to 
torture or to any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.’
Following this provision, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
between the EU and Kenya was signed on 6 March 2009102 giving the 
101  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2007] OJ C303/2 Preamble. 
102  Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Government of Kenya on the 
conditions and modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of 
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Kenyan authorities the right to prosecute under the abovementioned 
conditions. The MoU utterly hides EU obligations,103 focusing only on 
Kenyan commitments regarding detainees’ fundamental rights. Article 2 
(c) becomes a declaration of principles:
The signatories confi rm that they will treat persons transferred un-
der this [MoU], both prior to and following transfer, humanely and in 
accordance with international human rights obligations, including 
the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading 
treatment or punishment, the prohibition of arbitrary detention and 
in accordance with the requirement to have a fair trial.
The rights of transferred persons are further developed in Article 3. 
It is worth mentioning the right to be brought promptly before a judge 
who will decide on the lawfulness of detention (b); the right to a ‘fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’ (d); the right to be presumed innocent (e); minimum 
guarantees regarding criminal charges (the right to be informed promptly 
in a language which the accused understands, the right to legal counsel, 
the right to trial without undue delay, and so forth) (f); the right to appeal 
against conviction and sentencing to a higher tribunal (though in accord-
ance with the law of Kenya). Lastly, Article 4 establishes that ‘[n]o trans-
ferred person will be liable to suffer the death sentence. Kenya will, in 
accordance with the applicable laws, take steps to ensure that any death 
sentence is commuted to a sentence of imprisonment.’ This provision is 
essential because Kenya has not yet abolished the death penalty.
Notwithstanding such commitments, prisons in Kenya are infamous 
for violence and human rights violations against inmates in confl ict with 
the abovementioned provision. Therefore, it is the duty of European dip-
lomatic authorities on the ground to effectively follow up on the condi-
tions in which suspected pirates are held in Kenyan prisons, as well as 
the outcome of trials, to ensure that they meet the requirements laid 
down in Article 12.2 JA. Similarly, Article 5 (f) of the MoU enables access 
by international organisations to monitor prisoners’ conditions. However, 
the enforcement of the provisions contained in the MoU remains limited 
since ‘... disputes concerning the interpretation or application of these 
provisions will be settled exclusively by diplomatic means between Kenya 
and EU representatives’ (Article 8 (b)).
piracy and detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized prop-
erty in the possession of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment 
after such transfer [2009] OJ L79/49.
103  It has been suggested that Kenya would get speedboats, helicopters and modern fi re trucks 
in exchange. M Gebauer and H Stark, ‘Somali pirate trial tests limits of EU mission’ Spiegel 
Online (1 April 2009) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,616760,00.
html>. 
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The outcome of the fi rst trial, which started in April 2009, is likely to 
jeopardise the authority of EU NAVFOR. It opposes Kenyan public pros-
ecutors to nine suspected pirates, captured by a German frigate while 
escaping from the scene of a pirate attack. But there seem to be sev-
eral fl aws in the whole case. The pirates’ German attorneys are trying 
to demonstrate that their arrest did not take place during the attack. In 
addition, the German captain threw the pirates’ weapons overboard by 
mistake, which means that little evidence is left as proof of the detainees’ 
actual activity.
The same applies to six Somali suspects who have been kept under 
arrest in Paris since April 2008. They are being prosecuted on charges 
of ‘organised criminality’ for hijacking a yacht and taking hostages with 
the intention of securing a ransom, a crime for which they face life im-
prisonment. Despite French defence lawyers’ claims of irregularities re-
garding procedural rules (French soldiers were not entitled to carry out 
the arrests after the attack, irregular transfer to France, and custody 
conditions in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights) the 
Paris chamber in charge of preparing the case gave the green light for the 
trial on 6 April 2009.
Even though the risk of public exposure of military techniques might 
seem bad, there could not be a worse example of how to deal with ar-
rested pirates than Spain, where the arrest and prosecution of pirates 
revealed contradictions between the military and the judiciary. The arrest 
of 14 suspected pirates by the Spanish frigate participating in Atalanta 
led to a blind alley in May 2009, when a judge of the Spanish Audiencia 
Nacional high court decided, upon the request of the public prosecutor, 
to claim jurisdiction over the pirates on several grounds (unlawful arrest, 
aggravated robbery and illegal bearing of weapons) separate from the in-
ternational criminal jurisdiction which is expressly permitted by Article 
105 UNCLOS. Their transfer to Kenya was blocked for several days and 
the validity of the Agreement EU-Kenya would have been brought into 
question in the event of the detainees being the subject of criminal pro-
ceedings started in Spain. Finally the judge backtracked and withdrew 
the motion, but the lack of co-ordination between the Spanish military 
and judiciary had already been publicly exposed.
EU NAVFOR has increasingly been capturing pirates and handing 
them over to Kenya104 but the abovementioned shortcomings still drive 
a number of participating MS to release captured pirates on the nearest 
beach once their ships and weapons have been confi scated. To para-
phrase Waters, one of the overriding concerns for EU-led troops is the dif-
104  As of May 2009, EU NAVFOR forces had handed over 51 suspected pirates out of 52 of 
those arrested. EU NAVFOR, News in brief (14 May 2009) <http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/showpage.aspx?id=1567&lang=EN>. 
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fi culty in anticipating the various domestic and international legal chal-
lenges which may arise.105 Such insecurity may eventually hinder the 
outcome of the mission. 
e) A modest fi nancial and military commitment
Financially speaking, EU NAVFOR is rather small, as the common 
costs are estimated at EUR 8.3m for one year. This is in stark contrast 
with other ongoing military operations with a high-profi le role for the EU 
in Africa, such as the peacekeeping force in eastern Chad (3,700 troops). 
Militarily speaking, no more than six European warships, as well as a few 
maritime surveillance aircraft and some 1,000 soldiers, are likely to be 
involved in the EU mission at any given time. Once again, the territorial 
scope bears no relation to the means employed. As Rear Admiral Philip 
Jones, Chief Commander of EU NAVFOR, once pointed out: the area is so 
large that hundreds of ships could exploit gaps in surveillance.
All in all, the actual commitment of MS towards EU NAVFOR seems 
modest compared to the demands. Efthimios Mitropoulos, Secretary Gen-
eral of the International Maritime Organisation, has expressed his wish 
‘to see governments committing suffi cient numbers of warships, military 
aircraft and surveillance assets to the region and to co-ordinate their 
command and control under the auspices of a United Nations mandate’ 
rather than one from a defence organisation.106
3. A revision of the approach followed in Somalia in the light of EU 
foreign policy objectives
Most scholars and politicians have called for a comprehensive ap-
proach to tackle piracy off Somalia. As Vines and Middleton have ex-
plained:
CFSP is about more than just military missions, and the EU is com-
mitted to building a comprehensive approach that combines tradi-
tional dimensions of security with support for economic develop-
ment, good governance and institutional strengthening in countries 
at risk … Although EU member states are less willing than in the 
past to commit troops to UN missions, the development of EU mili-
tary operations acting as precursors to longer-term missions means 
EU soldiers will continue to play a direct role in creating peace and 
stability.107 (emphasis added)
105  C Waters, ‘Is the Military Legally Encircled?’ (2008) 8 Defence Studies 28.
106  Financial Times (3 November 2008).
107  A Vines and R Middleton, ‘Options for the EU to Secure the African Peace and Security 
Architecture’, Study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Af-
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On the situation in Somalia, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 
stated clearly on 16 March 2009 that
[a]ny measures taken in both the short-term and the long-term to 
combat piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia will re-
quire an integrated approach that incorporates support of the peace 
process; strengthening of capacity on land, such as support to AMI-
SOM and the Somali security forces; strengthening of legal and mar-
itime institutions such as the Somali and regional coastguards; ad-
dressing the lack of accountability by apprehending and prosecuting 
those suspected of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea; strict 
compliance with arms embargoes in pursuance of the relevant Secu-
rity Council resolutions; and peace-building efforts to empower local 
communities.108 (emphasis added)
Likewise, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 
affi rmed on 26 May 2008 
… its commitment to a comprehensive approach to a lasting settle-
ment of the Somali crisis, covering its political, security and human-
itarian aspects. It reiterates that the only way to restore the situation 
is through a political process ultimately inclusive of all concerned 
Somali stakeholders that renounce violence in the interest of the 
people of Somalia.109 (emphasis added)
Similar statements were included in the GAERC conclusions of 16 
June, 22 July and 15 September 2008. The approach to the subject 
seemed to focus on the development and humanitarian aspects of the 
Somali confl ict at that time from the perspective of an external observer. 
As the frequency of attacks against European ships increased through-
out 2008, piracy was placed higher on the political agenda and the focus 
gradually shifted to security issues and concerns. From November 2008, 
the expression ‘comprehensive approach’ disappeared from Council con-
clusions and attention was paid solely to the fi ght against piracy and 
armed robbery off the Somali coast.110
fairs (February 2008) 35 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/
download.do?language=en&fi le=23448#search=%20africa%20peace%20>.
108  UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1846 
(2008)’ (2009) UN Doc S/2009/146 (16 March 2009) 10.
109  GAERC Conclusions 26-27 May 2008, Doc 9868/08 point 1. These conclusions made 
no reference to piracy before point 9. 
110  See GAERC Conclusions 10 November 2008, Doc. 15394/08; GAERC Conclusions 8 
December 2008, Doc. 16862/08; GAERC Conclusions 26 February 2009, Doc. 6877/09; 
JHA Conclusions 26 February 2009, Doc. 6877/09; GAERC Conclusions 27 April 2009, 
Doc. 9098/09; GAERC Conclusions 26 February 2009, Doc. 6877/09.
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Meanwhile, individual EU politicians have continued calling for a 
comprehensive approach as the best solution for Somalia. The Commis-
sioner for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs stated in January 2009: ‘[w]e 
fi rmly believe that the road to enhanced maritime security lies in an in-
tegrated approach. This should translate into effective and permanent 
civilian/military co-operation, coupled with cross-sectoral co-ordination 
at civilian level.’111 Two months later, the Czech Presidency deemed it im-
portant that ‘the international response to piracy off the coasts of Somalia 
be accompanied by continued efforts and a longer-term strategy aiming 
to bring peace, stability and recovery to Somalia and its people’.112 
Given the above, it would be no exaggeration to conclude that EU 
political leaders mention the need for an integrated approach to securing 
a long-lasting peace in the Horn of Africa more easily in speeches than 
in written documents resulting from negotiations. No Council document 
recalls in 2009 the link between the current situation off-shore and the 
need to address the impoverishment of the population on land. Inter-
estingly enough, the Joint EU Africa Communiqué of 16 January 2009 
neglects poverty as a root cause of piracy in favour of the power vacuum 
when stating that ‘… the issue of piracy is part of the continuing politi-
cal crisis in Somalia, which should be dealt with for the achievement of 
a long-lasting sustainable resolution to the problem of piracy.’113 As a 
result, long-term development tools become a secondary band-aid to an 
issue that is primarily perceived as a security concern.
Likewise, the Council conclusions of May 2009 attach more impor-
tance to the support of the security sector in Somalia prior to develop-
ment, a line of reasoning reminiscent of the ‘fi rst security, then develop-
ment’ philosophy of the European Security Strategy of 2003:
The Council notes that a stable security environment in Somalia is 
vital for building state institutions, providing adequate humanitar-
ian aid, kick-starting recovery efforts and reducing the threat of pi-
racy. … The Council supports the ambition of the new Transitional 
Federal Government to focus on the development and strengthening 
of national capacity in the security sector. The security sector should 
111  Borg (n 46).
112  P Kaiser (Deputy Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to the United Na-
tions), Statement on behalf of the European Union on The Situation in Somalia at the 




113  Council of the EU, Strategic Africa-EU Partnership: Joint Communiqué from the Minis-
terial Troika Meeting in Kleinmond, Doc. 5462/09 (16 January 2009) 7.
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be fi rmly committed to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and 
the principles of good governance and accountability.114
A fi nal argument reinforcing change in the European approach to-
wards Somalia and piracy is linked to the support provided by the EU 
to the signing on 29 January 2009 of a regional co-operation agreement 
between countries in the Gulf of Aden, known as the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct.115 This document aims to replicate in the Horn of Africa the 
excellent results of the regional agreement concluded in Asia that led 
to a signifi cant decrease in pirate attacks in the Malacca Straits. This 
initiative was taken within the framework of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). Although the European Commission has the relevant 
competences within the framework of fi sheries and maritime affairs, it 
did not participate in the Djibouti meeting because the EU as such is not 
a member of the IMO. Interestingly, EU representation was ensured, but 
not by the Presidency but by two UK Admirals of EU NAVFOR, reinforcing 
the perception of this initiative as a security issue rather than a maritime 
one.  
Some refl ections should be made as regards EU actors’ tendency to 
praise the so-called global and integrated approach towards Somalia. As 
analysed in Section 2, this is not fully backed up by the facts. This con-
clusion has already been suggested regarding development aid but can 
also apply to Operation Atalanta.
When the UNSC adopted a Resolution that authorised resorting to 
force to deter and prevent pirate attacks and thus protect WFP vessels en 
route towards Somalia, the French Ambassador to the UN, Jean-Maurice 
Ripert, expressed his satisfaction stating that ‘… at the end of the year, 
3.5 million people will be depending only on the WFP and international 
114  Council of the EU, GAERC Conclusions on External Relations, Doc 10009/09 (18-19 
May 2009) 13.
115  The Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden was adopted by 17 coun-
tries at a high-level meeting held by the IMO in Djibouti. It immediately came into force 
with the signatures of nine regional States. The Code of Conduct starts by recognising the 
problem of piracy and armed robbery against ships, and its impact on the region. The signa-
tories declare their intention to co-operate to the fullest extent, in a manner consistent with 
international law, in the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The means 
of co-operation cover: fi rst, sharing relevant information through a system of national focal 
points and information centres; second, interdicting ships suspected of engaging in acts 
of piracy or armed robbery against ships; third, ensuring that suspected pirates are ap-
prehended and prosecuted; fourth, facilitating proper care, treatment, and repatriation for 
seafarers, fi shermen, other shipboard personnel and passengers subject to acts of piracy 
or armed robbery against ships, particularly those who have been subjected to violence. 
The Code of Conduct also covers the possibilities of shared operations, such as nominating 
law enforcement or other authorised offi cials to embark on the patrol ships or aircraft of 
another signatory. <www.imo.org>.
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assistance … pirates are killing Somalis every day, they are killing the So-
mali people, little by little.’116 This statement offers just an example of the 
willingness to present individual and collective measures against Somali 
pirates before public opinion as if they were genuinely aimed at long-term 
objectives instead of short-term ones, and collective objectives instead of 
self-regarding ones. We will briefl y explain these concepts next.
As explained in Section 2, in the post-Cold War international con-
text, international actors increasingly feel the need to resort to structural 
foreign policy tools if they want to play a signifi cant role on the interna-
tional stage. The dimensions of foreign policy based on non-domination 
have proven their value since the nineties (eg Eastern enlargement of 
the European Union) whereas the limitations of a foreign policy purely 
based on domination have already been witnessed in other confl icts that 
seem to be at a dead end (eg Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan). In the context of 
the 21st century, there is a growing need for structural policy tools which 
focus more on processes than confl icts, more on non-State actors and 
civil society than on elites and governmental actors, and more on long-
term aspirations than short-term solutions to confl icts. Collective inter-
ests (those that benefi t several States and actors) must be borne in mind 
besides self-regarding interests (those that benefi t fi rst and foremost the 
State in question) in a context of enhanced interdependence, and in-
creasing vulnerability and uncertainty.117
As far as the European Union is concerned, recent years have wit-
nessed a willingness to gradually complement its traditional role of ‘civil-
ian actor’ in international politics with a more dominant one, slowly but 
surely taking steps towards a common defence policy. On the interna-
tional stage, the ESDP helps the EU to assert its identity in front of tra-
ditional powers such as the US or Russia. However, the ESDP still plays 
a signifi cant role at the internal level, since it makes it easier for many 
European States to maintain and foster their national defence policies in 
a context of increasing disdain towards defence budgets on the part of 
national public opinions. This might not be the case with the UK, but it 
certainly is when it comes to Spain or France. Presenting EU ESDP mis-
sions as seeking altruistic goals helps to win popular support at home as 
well as in target countries.
We can therefore conclude that external objectives (those aimed at 
having an actual impact on the situation in the partner country) are not 
always the trigger for foreign policy decisions. Public statements in the 
EU press showing a willingness to pursue external objectives can often 
116  Stakeout de M Jean-Maurice Ripert à la suite du vote de la résolution 1838, 7 October 
2008 <http://franceonu.org/spip.php?article2644>.
117  Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (n 24) 21-2.
236 Maria Luisa Sanchez Barrueco: Refl ections on the EU Foreign Policy Objectives behind...
conceal other objectives related to the internal situation within the EU. 
Three hidden objectives must however be taken into account: integration 
objectives, identity objectives and interrelational objectives.118 Certain in-
dicators show that this conclusion can be seen in the European response 
towards Somalia.
After an overall appraisal of EU initiatives aimed at tackling the situ-
ation in Somalia, the least that one can say is that European action is a 
drop in the ocean, insuffi cient to address the root causes of the confl ict. 
On land, the effectiveness of EC development co-operation is hampered 
by the high risk situation in which aid must be delivered. The granting 
of further amounts of funds is thus discouraged and diverted towards 
securer countries. Off-shore, EU NAVFOR-Atalanta has not been given 
the means to effectively carry out its mission to the end. It can there-
fore be suggested that European action towards Somalia is not primarily 
driven by external objectives, despite the public statements of European 
spokespersons. If it was, more conventional and non-conventional means 
would have been committed to achieving stability on shore in order to end 
piracy off the Somali coast. Consequently, the abovementioned internal 
objectives are somehow hidden behind the facade of European altruism. 
Internal objectives refer to the European Union itself and tend to 
strengthen integration and European identity. The simple fact of launch-
ing a naval military mission was itself a milestone in ESDP history. It 
proved once again that there was agreement among MS on defence mat-
ters and involved navies for the fi rst time ever, thus supporting those 
advocating further steps in the fi eld of capabilities. The images of EU 
NAVFOR frigates escorting WPF vessels, as well as those of successful 
skirmishes with pirates, have been shown around the world through of-
fi cial websites and newspapers. Subsequently, EU visibility as a global 
actor has been enhanced, particularly for internal consumption.
Other internal objectives refer to EU foreign policy as a bottom-up 
Europeanisation of national foreign policies. France and Spain were the 
launchers of the European initiative in Somalia. However, a closer look 
might show that French and Spanish interest in the successful accom-
plishment of EU NAVFOR’s mission has much more of a national than a 
European nature. 
The launch of the mission was on 8 December 2008. France held the 
EU Presidency until the end of that year and one of the main goals of the 
French Presidency was to foster European defence collaboration with a 
view to being fully reintegrated into the NATO military structure after an 
absence of 43 years, a decision announced at the Strasbourg and Kehl 
118  Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (n 24) 12-13.
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NATO summit (3-4 April 2009). French President Sarkozy linked this 
decision to progress in the ESDP during the second semester of 2008. 
Therefore, French diplomacy tried to take modest though realistic steps 
towards achieving European collaboration in defence matters. Hence the 
symbolic importance attached to the war on pirates.119
The Spanish boost to Atalanta was also driven by self-regarding ob-
jectives to a great extent. Spanish fi shermen depend largely upon catches 
in the Indian Ocean. After several serious attempts, the Playa de Bakio 
vessel was hijacked by pirates in April 2008. Its release came after the 
ship’s owner paid a ransom. The inactivity of Prime Minister Zapatero’s 
government was then exposed in Parliament by the Basque nationalist 
party120 (most fi shing or seafaring companies in the Indian Ocean are 
Basque). At the time, this party played an important role as a necessary 
partner for President Zapatero in the daily implementation of policy. As a 
result, a government whose lack of affection for defence matters is well-
known across Europe (sudden withdrawals from both Iraq and Kosovo 
are good examples of this), unsurprisingly waved the fl ag of European 
defence when it came to the Gulf of Aden. However, a critical and mostly 
unexpected shift in local politics happened in March 2009, when elec-
toral results opened the door for the fi rst non-nationalist Basque govern-
ment ever, headed by a Socialist. Consequently, the initial position of the 
Spanish government has changed substantially.
To sum up, the evolution of events in the Indian Ocean, and particu-
larly in Somalia, refl ects in our opinion a failure of the ‘fi rst security, then 
development’ philosophy of the 2003 European Security Strategy121 and 
is a fl awed attempt at making the EU evolve from a ‘civilian only’ security 
actor resorting solely to ‘soft power’ means, towards a ‘hard power’ that 
can effectively use its military power.122
That EU NAVFOR has been granted insuffi cient means is a fact. 
However, the question remains unanswered as to whether the underlying 
reason for this is continuously dropping defence budgets, the military 
capability gap or, more likely, the absence of a clear MS commitment 
119  James Blitz, ‘French optimism on plan for EU defence pool’, Financial Times (2 October 
2008); Laurent Zecchini, ‘Face aux attaques de pirates, la mobilisation navale internation-
ale montre ses limites’, Le Monde (Paris 19 November 2008).




121  European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003 < http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/
cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.
122  S Silvestri, ‘Revising the European Security Strategy: arguments for discussion’ (2008) 
Instituto Affari Internazionale, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/IAI_Silvestri_300508.pdf> 7.
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towards fi nding a structural and enduring solution for Somalia. In fact, 
security of oil and goods supply in Europe appears to be the main goal, 
as no major solution had been fostered by EU partners at the UNSC level 
until piracy put supplies at risk.
Two other areas have been proposed in which the commitment of the 
EU and MS towards Somalia could be demonstrated, but neither have 
prospered. Firstly, the African Union has repeatedly called on the EU to 
deploy a peacekeeping force in Somalia, but the EU has always rejected 
a commitment on land. Secondly, allegations concerning European com-
panies dumping toxic waste off the Somali coast have never received a 
defi nite answer from EU governments.
At present, it seems to us risky to openly assert the success of EU 
NAVFOR Operation Atalanta when only six months have passed since it 
was launched. The renewal of its mandate by the Council notwithstand-
ing, every day it becomes more likely that this operation will fall short of 
its ambitions.123 However, nobody dares to picture a scenario in which the 
fi rst European naval military mission would return home empty-handed 
or the impact which that contingency could have not only on the ESDP, 
but also on the external perception of the EU as a ‘global actor’.
123  On the recommendation of SG/HR Javier Solana (‘Edited remarks at the meetings of EU 
defence ministers in the framework of the GAERC Council’ Doc S128/09 (18 May 2009) 3), 
the Council decided on 15 June 2009 to extend the mandate of Operation Atalanta for one 
year from its current end date of 13 December 2009.
